HOW TO MAKE THE NEW WORLD ORDER
LOOK NEW, AFTER ALL

An assessment on how Globalization-related impacts need to be dealt with within Global Governance Systems

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HOW TO MAKE THE NEW WORLD ORDER LOOK NEW, AFTER ALL
An assessment on how Globalization-related impacts need to be dealt with within Global Governance Systems

Final essay presented to the undergraduate course of International Relations of the University of Brasilia, as a partial requisite for the achievement of the grade of Bachelors in International Relations.

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Abstract

This paper intends to create a framework of analysis for Globalization-Related changes and phenomena in the international world. Starting with the premise that institutions included in the international arena are based on old state-centric theories that are no longer enough to explain the world phenomena the article flows through older theorists such as Kenichi Ohmae and James Rosenau to draw comparisons with newer scholarships, like the ideas from Bertrand Badie. By choosing four of the most important paradigms of international relations (Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War & Global Issues and Borders), the article criticizes and explains how globalization changes the way those paradigms work and interact with institutions and the global system, besides proposing new methods of analysis to create adapted assessments and real comprehension over today’s international phenomena.

The article concludes that Rosenau’s idea on the importance of Micro-Macro relations both relates to Kenichi’s point of view on the importance of individuals and non-state actors, which complies with the arguments presented by Badie, two decades later, in his assessment over Diplomacy. The summarized conclusion is that individuals have been empowered to take part in international relations; in a way institutions have to adapt and comply to be able to succeed. Nevertheless, State-related institutions and actors are still very important to the international arena, as they hold roles, agenda setting power and resources to address issues and political discussions.

In this sense, to prove the validity of the conclusions, the article draws an analysis on the Brazilian conjuncture, showing that all the four paradigms are obsolete if not analyzed by means of globalized analytical tools, and that smarter action from institutions is needed to address global concerns and to improve their efficiency and capabilities.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

From the 1940’s to today, the world unpredictably became unpredictable, hard to understand. Why? Did education lose quality? Are the changes too fast for theorists and analysts to follow? In my stance of the world, what is misunderstood is the very core, the first assumption in which most mainstream and critical theory are based upon: The unit of analysis, the atom being the state within a state-centric world view. Such state-centrism will be the main focus of analysis of this work.

There has been a major change both in the world and in society in the last decades, which most people feel through technological developments, or through the appraisal of different international phenomena denoting integration. This was not, though, a subtle or unpredicted phenomenon. Often named globalization, it exists for a relatively long time now, especially as one considers pioneer works on the subject, as Rosenau’s, which are over 2 decades old by now. Globalization has certainly changed the way people relate to other people internationally, and the news is that, although it hasn’t been mainly taken into account, it deeply affects the way the whole International System behaves and is explained, to the extent of questioning the real existence of an anarchical setting of sovereign states. (Kenichi, 1996). In this sense, if one considers the predominance of the notion of the state as being at the center stage of the study and analysis of International Relations Theory, such theory is destined to always be a step behind the world’s history, when considering the consequences of globalization. Thus, recognizing the need to change this scenario, by focusing on institutions and other international tools created by the State Centric Paradigm, *i.e.* Diplomacy (Badie, 2008), this essay shall analyze the new trends for theoretical development in international relations regarding the structural change globalization leads day to day, impacting paradigms of international relations, such as Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, for instance.

The development of new communication methods, the creation of new technology, the advent of information science and the new means of transportation have done far more than “shrinking” the world or loosening borders around the globe, as simple assessments may
state. They have changed the way individuals interact with the world and, in a deeper analysis, have empowered individuals to act globally (Badie, 2008). What is the connection, then, with the unpredictability of world phenomena like the Arab Spring; and what is the restriction posed to theory, regarding this point of view?

In order to explain it, I may draw an analogy with an area of social studies that has been through a similar situation. The International Court of Justice Judge, Professor Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade (2008), in his lecture about the development of International Law, talks about three major moments in International Law history. At first, he describes the creation of international law. At its very beginning, professor Cançado says, International Law was meant as a tool for individuals to reach justice in the international level¹. In his stance his explanation, the judge cites some of the considered founding fathers of International Law, like Grotius, Puffendorf, Francesco Soares and Francesco de Vitoria, and shows how their ideas of what international law was did put the individuals in the midst of analysis, as the main subject matter. As the years came by, though, Trindade describes how the rise of the State centric theory in the XIX century led International Law to become not a law for individuals, but a law for states. International Law started to take individuals away from the center of law and disputes, and instead, started to have its discussions focused on treaties and alliances, reinforcing the central role of the state. Considering the state the unit of International Relations is a feature the contemporary generation of international scholars is used to, but it is not how international relations began (Badie, 2008) (Barber, 2013) (Cançado Trindade, 2008). Also, Trindade affirms that there is a turning trend in International Law. Deriving from minority protection movements and ethnical groups protection theory, International Law gradually started putting individuals in the center of their own discussions, which professor Trindade calls a return to its origin, and not any kind of institutional innovation, as most scholars state (Trindade, 2008). I believe International Relations are undergoing a similar movement.

Today’s diplomacy, for example, derives basically from the trends of diplomacy from about 400 years ago, according to professor Badie. In that time, Diplomacy was a means of solving problems for Princes, that is, individuals. They were the subjects of diplomacy, and would control it through their own individual strategy. Whether it was a border discussion

¹ I understand 'International' is not a proper word to describe the moment. Europe, where this development started, was not yet a continent with the nations we know today. In order to avoid deepening in this fact, though, and aware of the limitations of the concept, I chose to use the word here.
around the building of a bridge, or a negotiation on farmable lands regarding inheritance, Princes were the final subjects, and diplomacy was built onto that basis (Badie, 2008).

At this point, it is important to ponder some matters. Throughout the article, I may criticize part of the state-centric theory, as I believe it is not enough of a representative theory to explain how the world works. Hence it is not fine to use it as the basis for the institutions built in a country. However, this essay will not defend the end of Nation States (Barber, 2013), and, thus, will not propose the end of diplomacy as a means of communications between governments or anything alike. This is exactly the point I wanted to reach. It’s fine to create formal channels of communication between governments. The problem is that the basic premise of creating diplomacy is accepting the theoretical unit of international relations as the state and using this worldview to recognize diplomacy as the means of communication between countries, nations. This will be discussed with further details on the following pages, but something important to state right now is that countries are much more than the governments they embed (Badie, 2008).

Countries are made of enterprises, NGO’s, institutions, cities, provinces and, above all, people. All of these units, in the globalized world we live in (and this is a reality!), are capable of relating to counterparts or other instances internationally, creating what I like calling paradiplomacy. If we try to think of all of the possibilities that arise in this context, it is impossible to accept diplomacy as the formal means of communication between countries, as even governments become small portions of what international relations are. Following the trend, foreign policy can lose some sense if we think of it. In the globalized world, how much of trade system and financial operations are undertaken by governments? How much of the culture spread out is done under the sovereignty of a government? Everything looks different, unpredictable. Immigration, NGO’s, police forces, movies, books, information and international phenomena flow throughout the countries in a rate no government is capable of controlling.

Therefore, we need a new way of understanding the world, where states are not the units, but part of the political equation that shapes foreign policy, for example. In this new

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2 Although paradiplomacy is a term originally created by Soldatos (1990) to describe the relation between cities and subunits of the state in an international level, I believe it’s important to expand the concept here, as a way of avoiding the creation of other words and concepts. Professor Ironildes (2013) may state on the difference between paradiplomacy and corporate diplomacy; nonetheless, this articles scope is too simple on that subject to need such divisions.
way of viewing the world, global issues like climate change acquire a very different meaning. But let us start with the beginning.

I may explain how this article will be organized. The next two chapters will be focused on the formal design of the article. At first, a review on the important literature used to make the essay, going through concepts, authors, and what their ideas are. The intent of the section is to make it clear where the article is. I want to leave no doubt on the theories I will criticize, and the concepts I will adopt, so that there is no misunderstanding, or at least there’s less. Also, this section will encompass all of the theory I want to use to explain my thoughts. It will serve as a nest to everything I say. All of the ideas, arguments, examples, conclusions and analysis will be based on one of the theories formally stated in this section. The limits of using them, as well as the consequences, will be explained there.

After that, I will spend some time trying to formulate what methodologically has to be said. What is the research design of the essay? How will ideas be tested, assessed and proved true or wrong? How will the hypothesis be analyzed? What are the variables to be understood? How do they relate to one another? What is the relevance of assessing them? What will be the criteria used to explain the variables? All of these questions will be answered in this section. It is supposed to create the skeleton of the article, in a way that any International Relations scholar can think of the same variables and draw the same or different conclusions.

The last development section is to be a practical assessment of what would happen should we use the described tools and theories to explain a case. In case we put the individuals in the arena and change our worldview mode to an inclusive model, as proposed by Badie, a model that embraces globalization instead of not understanding it and neglecting its consequences. The main focus will be on the new opportunities and channels arisen by the new worldview, the new communication and relationship opportunities that the new International Relations scholars will have to deal with.

The conclusion of the article will serve as an epitome. In that part, the final tests will be made to the hypothesis and one may finally assess whether the ideas presented during the whole piece are or not congruent, are or not real. This article is not intended to prove a point, but to assess if the efforts made on the intent of explaining the international arena are being well focused and distributed. I will make some considerations on the most important challenges the world faces, and the likely outcome is to understand the new model of viewing the world as an opportunity to tackle global issues in a different way, besides boosting international relations and loosening borders even more, on the way to create global citizens.
Having described the sections of the article, and created a simple forecast on what one should expect from reading this piece of work, I may present my first analytical tool, a research question. This research question will provide guidance to the whole essay and is certainly one of the most important parts of the work, as the rest of the pages are mainly an attempt to answer it in a proper way. My research question is a causal question, and shall be stated this way: Why have the world contemporary phenomena become so hard to understand and predict?

Although it looks like a simple question, it encompasses two very important features. The first is that it assumes an increase in the difficulty of analyzing the world and the international relations phenomena. Albeit this assumption will be better explained in the next chapters, it is important to lay it bare, as it represents the first theoretical effort done by me in order to figure out what the world is. It is a historical effort, based on both Badie and Rosenau, which were the first inspirations for this article.

The second one is that besides acknowledging that global phenomena became harder to understand, I clearly state that there is a reason for it. This shall create two paths, which I may follow: A rational and a methodological. The former is approached during the essay, by explaining my view on the world and my interpretation of other authors’ ideas; I will always be looking for this one reason (or stack of reasons), which made global phenomena more intricate. The latter, by asking a why- question, I put a challenge to create a scientific piece through a causal research design, which may go through some case studies and pure logical deepening into theory and ideas.

Should the reader disagree with any of the features of the research question, any analysis or conclusion drawn from the research effort will seem vague and empty. In order to create a reasonable research work, though, and to enable a rational flow of ideas, one shall absorb these features and the premises behind so as to use them as the basis for the conclusions drawn. In this sense, considering no gross methodological errors will be made, I may manage to draw a path for my arguments and the reader may, then, agree or not with the achieved results.

Aside from the space for thinking that the research question provides, the first thing it generates is the need for a response. In this sense, I shall provide, at this first moment, a hypothesis, which I presume will be an accurate answer for the research question. The following chapters and efforts will serve as a tool to analyze this hypothesis, using various theoretical approaches so it can be stressed and, if my thoughts are right, proved. There is no need, however, for the hypothesis to be right. The research work behind it and the
methodology applied on the writing process are the actual treasures behind the scientific research.

Said that, I may present my hypothesis. Considering the abovementioned problem, the theoretical limits for understanding the globalized world, and the proposed research question, on the reasons why the world became harder to explain and understand, I propose the following answer: *The world did not become harder to understand. The contemporary situation of the world followed a logical and streamlined historical path. The old theoretical basis, though, and specially the political and non-political institutions derived from it, is, thus, the outdated paradigm. Those old-fashioned institutions do prevent, e.g. economical development, as they restrict (or don’t understand) the possible interactions between non-recognized international actors in the international arena; they also prevent efficient tackling on global issues as they restrict international activity to a narrow set of actors defined by an outdated theoretical model. Taking that into account, those state centric based institutions preclude the fulfillment of the world’s potential of interaction and growth as they restrict worldviews to variables, actors and categories that are not anymore the pivots or the leading actors in the international setting.*

There are several comments that need be made about using a hypothesis like mine. At first, it’s a very hard to falsify one. I mean, if you take account of the revealed problem, the hypothesis is nothing but a summary of what the world already is, although it’s an answer to the research question. The problem seems obvious, the core of it as well, so, why did I keep what looks like a biased hypothesis on my research work? Why did I keep a hypothesis that does not seem in need for much more explanation or research? There are three reasons for that.

The first reason is summarized by the word paradigm, within the hypothesis. I make, at first, the assumption that it takes many students some time to understand, that political and international relations theory play a major role on the formation of structures and institutions. Although every young scholar knows no theory is capable of explaining the entire world in a holistic way (and that is not a flaw, but a limit from theoretical thought, necessary to build working models), it takes a longer time until they start figuring out what the influence of theory is in the world we live in. Political institutions, institutional innovations, governmental programs, business strategy, all these humankind formal institutions are created after long periods of planning. This planning session often (if not always) includes analyzing theory and choosing fitting authors, models and ideas, so that outcomes and challenges can be measured and forecast. Now the obvious result is that institutions derive from theory from the
moment they were created, and that’s not different from international institutions and agents. Diplomacy, geopolitical studies, war strategy, business expansion plans, the international agenda and so many more institutions have a clear theoretical basis, and that’s fine. The problem is that once the theory is no longer capable of explaining the world in a proper way, once it becomes outdated, the institutions that were created with basis on it will probably lose efficiency or face new problems and challenges. That’s development, that’s when institutional innovation takes place. When it comes to international relations, though, as the assumed outdated paradigm (the state centric view, which takes States for the atoms, the units of International Relations) didn’t change from older theories to contemporary theory, even institutional innovation won’t solve the new problems and challenges that may arise.

The second reason is that even if it looks obvious, especially when you present evidence (and evidence will be shown), there is no foreseeable development towards the hypothesis. Although world interaction trends are to become even more globalized in sectors like trade, scientific development, social media and etc., tackling of global issues solutions like climate change still seek for options within the old fashioned institutions created by the state centric model. The recent conferences on Environment in Rio attest that, and the recently scheduled Conference in Europe for 2015 shows even more evidence. I can do nothing but assume we are trying to achieve different results by trying the same thing, and this makes no sense. It is not as though renowned theorists ignore everything about this, or as if decision takers are oblivious to globalization in order to keep on working on their own jobs. What might explain that, though, are the thoughts of two scholars, Graham T. Allison and Maria Helena Castro Santos. Despite the fact that they differ in many of their theoretical assumptions and creations, there is a drawn conclusion from them, which encompasses an explanation for the mentioned problem. They both believe there is no rationale in politics. I mean, they both draw models that assume politics aren’t but the resultant answer from a tremendously complex and crazy game of interests and influence. In this sense, it should not be a surprise that there is very little chance the world will change to a different organizational model. Again, I attest, I do not think it even makes sense to cry out for the extermination of Nation States, as they are established institutions. My idea is thinking of a world in which they are not the atoms, but part of the equation. It is important that global issues are tackled, and if the very single model in which we try to organize to address them is meaningless, something has to be done.

At last, but not least, there is a third reason to justify choosing to keep this hypothesis as my research’s test subject, and also as a challenge, even if it does not seem like so.
Provided that the hypothesis is proven, just in case, what happens is that we have an accredited model to say most institutions within the international level are predestined to fail. I am not only talking about political institutions, but multinational corporations’ expansion strategies, education system recruitment agencies’ lectures, everything, may be based upon the wrong pillars. We may have been fooled by our own thoughts of what the international arena has been for the last decades, in a way that we may have misunderstood most of the important international phenomena and, worst, we may be unaware of what the real potential of international interaction that globalization can create is. In that case, I want, more than proving my hypothesis, to draw some of the changes, in a minor level, that could exist, considering the hypothesis to be true. This is a very big challenge, and I do not expect this under graduation essay to do it. Nonetheless, I believe it is accomplishable to draw some ideas on specific sectors or industries. If so, what I can possibly be doing is drawing part of what future consulting, politics, economy and global interdependence may be, in a very simple and gross way. That would be enough.

These three are the reasons why I chose to keep a hard to falsify hypothesis, not because it would make my work easier, but because it would make it harder, as besides proving my hypothesis, I need to create an environment on which it can operate, an environment that differs and diverges from what international relations theory has been trying to be in the past 50 years. It’s quite a big challenge, and, I think, worth the risk.

Although aforementioned in a few ways, I believe it’s important to clearly state what the objectives of the research work are. As said beforehand, my hypothesis admits a simple delay problem within International Relations Theory, but a problem that may cause all of the efforts done within theory to be unaware of important features of the globalized world. In this sense, there are two main general objectives I want to achieve throughout the research process. The first one is to create a review on Badie’s thoughts on the subject. This review, however, will be an analytic one. In simpler words, I want to merge Badie’s ideas with various other authors’ in order to describe the necessary rational basis for the position Badie and other authors defend, which is also mine.

Despite the fact that it seems like a simple objective, it embeds a very important premise. Throughout International Relations and, in a bigger picture, Political and Social Sciences history, there has been a separate development between the so-called American School and the European (specially the French) School. In a very simple assessment, the Europeans, mainly the French, got closer to sociology while studying International Relations, whereas Americans focused on Political Science. In this sense, American International
Relations was destined to have a state-centric analysis, for example, while some French theories do recognize more of the work of sociologists like Durkheim, for example, within their analysis of International Relations, which creates space for different theories on how the international arena works. None of them is better or worse, but the ways the worldviews are built are very different. Also, due to the fact that most of the available theory comes from the US, it is true to say there is a balance problem within people’s world-views about the world, and that reflects, as said before, on the institutions, models, strategies and businesses that we create. Within that structure, my objective when gathering Badie’s and other authors’ ideas is also an effort to create some alternative means of understanding the world both to new scholars and to ordinary readers.

The second general objective is to provide insights on the existence of other ways of interacting with the world. The idea is that showcasing a new world-view has the potential to unlock new possibilities and opportunities for people, organizations and even governments to relate among themselves. Considering the hypothesis I drew, there is still plenty of space for these new interactions to be created and this is the kind of potential I want to unleash. Global Entrepreneurship, this is what the new status of the globalized world can grant. Born-global enterprises shall be no long rare, international development and cooperation efforts have to be the rule, not the exception. The solution for most problems people have is very likely somewhere around the world. The second objective, thus, is to be part of the creation of the basis for these solutions and opportunities to become globalized, as the world did.

Stating such objectives is an important exercise, since they will both serve as guidance for the research and indicators of its success on the assessment of the final results.

More than stating such audacious goals, though, it is important to create the path for some specific achievement, which will serve both to prove the hypothesis (and, on this specific dissertation’s case, assessing its implementation) and to specify the details involved. Hence, there are four chosen specific objectives I want to achieve during the research process, which will serve both to strengthen the results and to create a practical environment for the hypothesis to work with.

The first objective is to show who the new actors of the international scene are. I have described the importance of knowing there are more important subjects of the international arena beforehand, but this single action of clearly stating who they may be is the one going to trigger the potential unleashing objective. As my hypothesis states, some actors of the international system are still unaware of their possible role in the world. In this sense, taking the responsibility of making it explicit is very important.
The second one is to criticize the idea of the nation state as the unit of the international system. At some points, this does seem to be the nucleus of the role of the theoretical model I am trying to draw. Although it is partially true, if you take my general objectives into consideration, this critic can’t but be part of the whole construction of a bigger argument, which focuses much more on potential and opportunities, and much less on problems. With that stated, criticizing the state centric status of international theory is one of my specific goals.

The third is to draw relations between technology development (communications, transports, IT) and international phenomena. The idea behind this objective is that if I want to create a world view capable of understanding the globalized world, I need to create the basis in which the new tools and development created by globalization are accepted within an international scope. This means considering communications, transports, IT and other 21st century technologies and realities as important aspects of the international phenomena and of the relations between international actors, in a way that the creation of practical solutions and models become feasible. That means if I can draw these relations I may be able to understand in which ways the globalized tools of development can affect international relations.

The fourth and last specific objective of the research is to introduce changes in worldviews, which can cause all areas of thought and human interrelations to alter. It looks bigger than it really is. As this topic is to be developed within the whole research, the specific objective is to create understanding on why the international system structure, its institutions and even the interrelations people draw themselves (within businesses, NGO’s, academy, politics…) should be different, in case we change our worldview, which is what defines them. In this sense, I am proposing an effort in a sense divergent from theoretical thinking. The objective is to find real evidence of this need of adaptation in order to create new models of behavior and of institutionalization. The potential achievement is to change strategy and possibilities from the way business go international to the way cities interact with each other.

Having presented the logical process I will follow during my research, my objectives and my guidance tools, I shall spend some time describing some of the problems I wish to tackle. I will keep the central problem of the research project off for now, in order to bring small challenges that the work will face to the discussion. Also, I don’t expect to describe every problem caused by a limited understanding of the world in this section. As I stated before, every institution and human relation can change, if a worldview is changed. In this sense, I have chosen some important problems I want to analyze here.
The first problem is the limited view of theory upon society regarding international matters, along with the limited view of society itself upon the world. Whether the world won’t recognize the role of society in the international arena or society won’t pose itself in order to become a major actor within international relations, in any case we have a problem. This is to be tackled by showing evidence of the ascendant importance of society in the international arena, and also by stating it as an actor on the international system.

The second problem is the lack of efficiency on tackling global issues. The main idea here is that an issue like climate change, for example, cannot be solved on the intergovernmental level. What I am trying to convey is that global issues concerning the whole of society and the whole of the institutions, governments, NGO’s and enterprises in the world are not going to be solved by each of them alone. Governments are not efficient in tackling issues like climate change or global trade, as they are not supposed to do so. This problem is to be solved by understanding that solutions for emerging global issues are to be solved by actors directly involved with them, and those actors need to be empowered to do so. We will take more time on this later.

The third problem is the lack of opportunities for collaboration. This problem is generated when decision-takers within national governments, for example, are not aware of the opportunities of collaboration the world does offer to them. It can be true in any of the organizational levels of a governmental institution (cities, provinces, countries), and can be true if local actors are not empowered, either, i.e., a multinational company which runs out of investments because no new markets have been mapped for expansion. This issue is harder to solve, even though the solution is quite simple. One of the objectives of this essay is to make people aware of the new opportunities globalization has generated on collaboration and cooperation, and this is a comprehensive solution for the mentioned problem. The challenge is to fulfill it, as there is a need for a global engagement program (in the individual level) capable of disseminating the idea.

Another problem is the classical zero-sum assumption posed to most international relations phenomena. Although even some mainstream theories have acknowledged zero-sum is no longer the reality of international relations (as negotiations and deals are supposed to benefit both parts of the treaty of agreement, even in the nation state level), some important institutions (i.e. diplomacy and foreign policy decisions) are still driven by this kind of logic. The consequence of it is that cooperation and interdependence are potentially lower due to the zero-sum rationalization. A solution for it is the showcase of evidence this article is willing to create, evidence that proves international interaction in all levels as a tool to create
development. Once the development potentiality is proven, the odds actors will adhere it are high.

The last problem is the incomplete assessments of world strategy for businesses and branding plans. By this I mean private institutions are also affected by a limited nation state centric worldview. In this case, more important than the solution (which would be awareness), are the new possibilities arisen from this new worldview. In this sense, Science of Complexity related solutions are to be analyzed as a new way of understanding corporate and private global relations.

By explaining my ideas I shall state I am aware of the challenges it will face in a real environment. Although even attesting how hard falsifying the hypothesis I built may seem controversial with this statement, it is important to think of the contemporary structures of international relations as a reality, as globalization is a reality that must be faced by theory. In this sense, one has to understand traditional institutional models are not likely to disappear in the short, middle and even long term. States will probably remain states, as diplomacy will probably remain the same. Institutional innovation is likely to happen, of course. Nonetheless, as previously stated, even institutional innovation, if based on the same outdated paradigm of state centric international relations, is not enough of a change to impact the functioning of institutions.

Old models are likely to continue existing, as decision makers are likely to continue basing their decisions on old theoretical models, although they do adapt to changes in society somehow, especially considering major changes in public opinion and individuals empowerment. This is not, though, a pessimist forecast. The model I want to defend does consider the mutual existence of every actor in the international arena, which is in some sense close to the reality of the contemporary world. Having the old actors recognize the new participants, though, is going to be challenging. Also, having scholars and the academy understand that the very core of the institutionalization of the international system is destined to be inefficient and to reach no solution is going to be hard. This difficulty, however, is part of the adapting procedures the world has to go through. Within societal relations, it’s surely faster. In the individual level, every new generation has new features and characteristics. My thoughts lead me to think this is the path we created for the international arena. The slow-paced change will lead to a societal like analysis on the international phenomena, a sociological approach capable of catching more than the interests of Prime Ministers and saying they are the interests of States, but of analyzing individual data and creating patterns that can explain behavior on demonstrations, partnerships, trade cycles and so forth.
One last thing that is important to bring up within the introduction section is the importance I believe this article may have for the scientific community. If you consider the objectives, at first, you will see that this essay represents at least two important aspects.

The first is a comprehensive assessment on the work of a scholar who differs from the mainstream current of theory. Maybe it encompasses solutions for specific issues or ideas that could unlock change within institutions, decisions and even other ideas. Considering this, the assessment work, besides the analysis, is a broadcasting work, which is also important for science.

A second unfolding is the possible number of new relations this work is capable of creating. Interactions between International Relations and individuals, technology, IT, Complexity Studies and much more, are still innovative ways of addressing International Relations, and they may hold many discoveries within them, many insights and maybe even new models, phenomena and theory. In this sense, scientific work is capable of imagining new ways of behaving and interacting with the world, both for international actors, institutions and individuals.

If you consider the hypothesis, you will see I assume there is a problem within international theory. From my point of view, theory is outdated and, therefore, is not capable of explaining the world in a proper way anymore. This opens space for further development on International Relations Theory, which opens space for new interpretations of the world itself and new institutions within the globalized arena. This is a very important achievement this essay is able to reach, although the challenges may harden the work. In this sense, the problem, the research question and the hypothesis proposed are related to very important discussions and matters within International Relations.

The conclusion, thus, is that the efforts applied within this dissertation are both legitimate and important for social science, as they can help understand the new shape the world has taken. As the world is not likely going to stop globalizing, we are the ones in need of adaptation. The faster we do it, the faster we will start taking advantage on the benefits of globalization and stop complaining on how tough and unpredictable it is.
Chapter 2

What does theory say?

“There can be an awareness of world changes without an awareness of that awareness”

—F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist

This quote has a very special meaning within this article. Whether we are talking about scholars, the general public, institutions or even the government, it embeds a simple truth, which sets the tone of my ideas. The profound changes globalization drew in the world are a reality, and although mainstream theory has not found a way to explain them yet, all over the world individuals, institutions and other players have been taking advantage of them.

Now it’s time, though, to embrace an important task. I have been writing on the objectives I have for the article, on the theoretical problems I have seen, but, if we dig deeper, what are these problems? This is the moment to take a position and state, clearly, where I am, theoretically speaking, and where I want to go.

The hypothesis I drew to explain the problem stated by the research question says the outdated paradigm of state centrisn, because of its condition, generates institutions that are destined to fail, or, at least, to have insurmountable difficulties, and that tend to get harder as globalization continues to grow. In this sense, and to keep the essay short, I have chosen four of those institutions, which I believe will be a good representation of the universe of institutions available in the world, for their importance, their reach within international relations and for their flaws. They are: Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War and Borders. Although these are not real institutions, like the UN or WTO, for instance, they are analogue to them, as they are built with basis on theory and they do act upon the world to shape it.

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3 Toward a Social Ecology. (New York: Plenum, 1975), p. 32. Apud (Rosenau 1990) I start with the same quote that begins Rosenau’s book, not without a reason. It does dictate the tone of this article, as it did with Rosenau's masterpiece.
At first, let’s take a look at Diplomacy. From the state centric point of view, Diplomacy is the official means of communication for the international arena (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011). When I say Diplomacy, thus, I am talking about bilateral communications, but, as well, about negotiation within International Organizations and multilateral seminars and debates. Diplomacy plays the role of the basic tool for creating relationship, the basic communication tool between States in the International System (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011). It is the way the nations ought to relate with each other, for every matter, and has several faces.

In this sense, States make diplomacy, as an outcome of national interests and international negotiation, within global politics. The role of Diplomacy in International Relations, then, is to be the political tool for States to relate to each other. It is the way bargains are made, treaties are signed and quarrels are solved, or not. It’s the bridge through which interests flow in the international arena. Hence it is considered to be the way States communicate with each other, and holds a very important position in International Relations Analyses. This is an old view, though.

It is important to know that scholarships have been thinking on the changes and turns diplomacy suffers, both in the way it happens and, in a bigger picture, in its roles within International Relations. From the 1980’s on, authors like Andrew F. Cooper, John English and Ramesh C. Thakur (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) have started drawing these changes, and have accomplished some very interesting outcomes. Among their predictions, there is the growth in the diplomatic importance of NGO’s, Multinational Corporations and even celebrities. (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) This opens space for some thinking. It is understandable that those actors have some importance within diplomacy. The divergence is caused because Sending argues those new characters have the potential to become sole actors for the diplomatic arena.(Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) Since the 1980’s, thus, developments within international relations analysis have been acknowledging the existence of different actors other than the Nation States. Sending goes further. Ask yourself: what causes changes in the turning trends of diplomacy? According to him, literature about new diplomacy is essentially a description of the effects of globalization.(Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011) In this sense, globalization means a gradual deterritorialization of social and political relations, in a way that both the diplomat’s role and nature – to represent by distance – change irreparably. (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011)

Similarly, Bertrand Badie’s *Le Diplomat et L’Intrus* explains how diplomacy has always been trying to keep far from individuals and to develop diplomatic activities in what
he calls *La Diplomatie de Boudoir*\(^4\), in secrecy. The games of diplomacy were not to be accessed by individuals, by non-professionals, not keen on the arts of negotiation and influenced by emotions. (Badie, 2008) International Relations, and thus, diplomacy, were to be held by states only, an interstate subject. According to Badie, we cannot, in today’s days, restrict to this kind of narrow definition, regarding diplomacy. Diplomacy is not anymore the art of interstate negotiation, as stated by Nicolson in 1963\(^5\). Diplomacy is the art of responding to every problem associated with the effects of separation and of distinction between spaces of proclaimed sovereignty\(^6\). In this sense, its role becomes to manage, within the international arena, the function of representation and communication, for all related actors.\(^7\) And this effect, according to Badie, derives from globalization, as it demands the worldview that built diplomacy to rebuild itself.

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the understanding of diplomacy goes much beyond its old concept. This opens space for understanding, for example, what the actual power of technologies is, regarding world communications. If one considers diplomacy to be the whole of communications and representation within the international arena, for actors other than the state, technologies, besides playing a very important role on the way diplomacy happens, triggers development of the tool to a much more complex level. In this new world, e.g. social media, Internet, data analysis and branding acquire a major role in shaping international relations. The way institutions and people relate to the world become more fluid, and the possibilities of interaction rise exponentially. If seen with the eyes of state centric theory, thus, diplomacy becomes an institution with limited applicability to the world we live in.

Having spoken about diplomacy, let’s move on to the next institution, Foreign Policy.

“Now take therefore what modern technology is capable of. To the power of our moral sense, allied to the power of modern communications and our ability to organize internationally. That, in my view, gives us the first opportunity, as a community, to fundamentally change the world. Foreign Policy can never be the same again, it cannot be run by elites, it has to be run,

\(^4\) *Boudoir* is a kind of closed room, very common in medieval buildings, which was used by women as a room where they could freely confabulate. In this sense, “*diplomatie de boudoir*” refers to the diplomatic activities as if they were moved by secret negotiations, intimate talks, intrigues and gossip. (BADIE, 2008)
\(^5\) Apud (BADIE, 2008)
\(^6\) DER DERIAN, 1987; SHARP, 1999; CONSTANTINOU, 1996; apud (Badie, 2008)
\(^7\) JONSSON, 2002, apud (Badie, 2008)
by listening to public opinions, of peoples who are blogging, who are communicating with each other, around the world.\footnote{BROWN, Gordon. Wiring a web for global good, lecture given on TED in 2009.}

When the former Prime Minister of The UK said the sentence above, he was talking to hundreds of people in one of the most prestigious stages of the world. In his speech, he wanted to urge for the understanding of the new strength for interconnection, interdependence and interaction that new technologies in communication had created, and how this changes the world we live in to every aspect. He showed how public opinion set off by shared pictures on the Internet had opened space for political change and for the creation of institutions, for example.

Although it partly spoils the end of the section on Foreign Policy, Brown’s quotation gives important content for analysis. At first, though, if Foreign Policy has to change, what is it now? Accepted definitions call Foreign Policy a government’s strategy in dealing with other nations.

A country formulates its own foreign policy, and applies it in international politics; global chambers of discussion, where treaties are negotiated and issues go through the agenda. Foreign policy is formulated in a different way depending on the country. To simplify the understanding on it, I want to use the concepts drawn by two authors, Graham T. Allison and Maria Helena de Castro Santos. Although they write about very different subjects (the Cuban Missile Crisis and the turmoil on bio fuel in Brazil, respectively), they both describe a political process that is useful for us, which is decision making. Allison describes a model where diverse actors, directly involved or not in situations, struggle, making use of their influence capacity and playing with their interests. This sense, the individual capacity of politicians, lobbyists, entrepreneurs, executives and any other involved individual, institution or organization, plus their role within the structure, play a game in which the decision, the policy, is the resultant force, not any kind of rational decision. Maria Helena describes a process close to this. In her opinion, in order to understand decision processes it is necessary to know whom the involved actors are, their role, interest and risk in being part of the decision process. This way, you can calculate what she calls a quarrel, rounds of discussion and negotiation in which, again, policy is nothing but a resultant of a game of influences and rhetorical speeches. Their vision is important to understand how foreign policy is created. It is not like foreign policy creation is a complete reasonless process, but it is not a completely economical man rational process. The limit of Allison and Santos’ theories is the structure.
Agents are comprised within structures, and do follow rules and plans set before their discussions, in a way that foreign policy creation is to be understood as a partially rational process, as it depends on the interests of the involved players, as well.

Taking that into account, we fall into the same dilemma Badie describes for diplomacy. Foreign policy is built within the doors of government; nonetheless, it is supposed to deal with national interests who are closely related to the populace and to the different national actors in a country, including NGO’s, corporations and scholars. The path, then, is to try to observe it from a decentralized view. Observing the construction of foreign policy and its application from a decentralized view, we can account the appearance of aspects other than politics that play an important role, i.e. public opinion.

Despite what has just been said, public opinion’s power to shape a country’s foreign policy is limited, it is important to acknowledge its appearance as an important player. More than that, now it is mandatory to relate it to, as Gordon said, the modern means of communication. The picture in Tiananmen Square, for example, started a set of demonstrations around the world and did set the tone of governmental actions from there on. The recent events we call Arab Spring, as well, would not be possible without the individuals and their capacity of sharing pictures through the internet, and although there were several other political issues involved, public opinion acted as a primary player on this international phenomena, something we cannot understand or explain unless we look at the international system with new eyes.

The third institution is an important institution, both because it will unfold one of the most significant discussions on the article, but especially because it is the one that mostly changed throughout the years. War.

Since Thucydides and on, war has set the tone of the development of international relations theory. Before contextualizing war on the non-state centric view of the world I have been drawing in the last pages, I want to discuss a little bit about its relation with International Relations Theory and its development.

In the beginning of the essay, I said International Relations theory was not capable of comprising globalization and explaining it and the world after it in a proper way. That is a lie. After globalization theory turns close to consensus nowadays, and it explains well the changes the world has been going through, the potential behind it, the new actors. Triggered by Rosenau and other pioneers, International Relations Theory developed to become more complex and comprehensive, adapted to the world it is supposed to explain. This development, though, has not met all of the international relations theory. It is obvious if we
think of economics, corporate networks and even leadership or education. One subject, though, and the related matters, have faced a different development, and kept encompassed by state centric International Relations theory conservative forces, war and security.

If we think of International Relations in the last century, though, specifically from 1950 until today, what we will conclude is that International Relations Analysis and Theory has been going around security and war as it main subject and most important phenomena. Accounting, as I said before, the importance of theory within the creation of institutions, and the way institutions are related to governance, we have the initial simple research question set to a more profound level, an even bigger problem, not only related to International Relations Theory, but to what theory, and what are the dominant theories, and why.

The dominant theory within International Relations, the one that shaped what we understand as the international system, its premises, institutions and actors, the one conservative enough to restrict the growth of new ideas and the one that justifies the hypothesis I drew by saying an outdated theory precludes world development. In a simple way of saying, this is the theory that grew out of war and security studies.

Given that short reflection, we shall go back to war and security. As an institution, war relates to International Relations theory in a variety of subjects. Geopolitics, security, weapons development, diplomatic efforts, leagues, alliances, all of those are instances in which countries have to deal with issues, risks and those are taken seriously. Sovereignty, as well, comes as an important subject. All of those are taken care of within international institutions – strengthening my previous comment -, and, thus, we may conclude war and security are very much related to, in chain, institutions, foreign policy and diplomacy. This is a game to be played, though, within the state centric paradigm created by the old international relations theory.

By bringing war and security to a non-state centric worldview, we are able to broaden the understanding of the issues related to it. There is a relevant bad consequence, though, thinking thoroughly. Is that both war and security issues become harder to understand and manage. It is, however, useful to understand what a different paradigm would allow us to view. Considering the globalized world as the subject of study, the first thing to pop out is the arousal of new issues. Privacy, food security, climate change, immigration and etc. become main issues of security. They do not superpose issues related to nuclear weapons or terrorism, although especially nuclear weaponry, as it becomes globalized, loses danger, as no government is really eager to use it. The difference is that considering expanded worldview questions of sovereignty, prosecution, guilt and threat lose some significance, giving space for
the mitigation of problems in a global level, where everybody feels responsible, everybody is affected and everybody needs to act. I may state this is not an urge for global acting on security issues, as, according to what I said previously, the nation state division of the world is not even likely to disappear. The end of the nation state is not a desired condition. The analysis of the world in a decentralized way is, though, of much importance, especially if we are eager to develop efficient institutions and tackle world problems effectively.

The last institution I want to talk about is Borders. Although it is a very important institution, especially to understand on the state centric theoretical scope, what I mainly want to assess is the way it loosens in a globalized world. Beyond that, how do individuals, empowered by globalization, go through borders?

What defines borders, then? It’s usual to think of borders as the imaginary lines that shred the world into countries. This comes with lots of assumptions. A border creates the limits of a sovereign country. Ultimately, borders restrict not only the territory comprised between them, but also the identity, culture and languages, in a sense that even people recognize themselves as nationals, as we come to the sense of where they were born (Khana, 2009). A border encompasses laws, customs, a political system and an economical growth space, measured by numbers and predictions. There is nothing new on this, though.

Some ideas on how globalization has loosened the borders of the world have arisen, and this is the point I want to discuss. I shall present two authors, who will both be basis on this article. Although their idea on this very same relationship between globalization and borders is quite different, I may try to use their both explanations to cover my hypothesis.

The first point of view comes from Badie. He argues that globalization destroys the rules of social and distributive justice (Badie, 2008). In this sense, frontiers of states are not frontiers of solidarity between people. This makes possible to state that there are possibilities that people abroad feel more proximate through political-religious solidarities than they do with people living near them in the same territory. It’s the spoken “end of the territory”.(Albert, David, & Lapid, 2001). In this different way of viewing borders, some interpersonal relations acquire a more important role within International Relations. The number of students going abroad, the quantity of imported movies (and other items of culture), the work of missionaries around today’s world and many other international phenomena shall arise as indexes and indicators that can help understand the world.

The second point of view comes from Parag Khanna (2009). He argues that although it looks like we live in a borderless world, especially when it comes to economy and infrastructure development, the geopolitical border lines are still important, both to
understand international phenomena and to understand political insurgence. What he calls postcolonial entropy is the movement of countries being created on the very core of other countries, it’s the consequences of the colonial divisions created by western civilizations, that arises to create quarrels and fights for autonomy, insufflated by the existing borders. It is important to take his point of view into account, in order to understand two things: at first, when I say institutions are destined to fail because of the obsolete theory they base upon, I am not predicting their end, but the need of a different approach. This goes very well with borders. Following Khanna’s point of view, there is much more to look for at borders than what is usually set. Secondly, in spite of the fact that borders derive from an obsolete theoretical model, their existence is an asset for international relations, and has to be assessed, although in a modern way, which considers, for example, Badie’s thoughts.

Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War and Borders, thus, play a very important role for the understanding of international relations. Having considered new approaches and understanding methods for them, thus, is the first step into creating solutions for the aforementioned structural problems within the building of institutions. Flowing through new theoretical ways of analyzing the world, I believe we have created a streamlined path to what the rest of the article is going to be.

To enhance the discussion, then, there are three important authors I have to write about. Bertrand Badie, Kenichi Ohmae and James Rosenau. At this point, there is an important comment I want to make. As I said, there is no lack of new theory within international relations analysis. Theory is being developed to address every single change the world suffers. Why, then, would I be writing on the obsoleteness of theory? More than that, why would I use two 2 decades old books to describe a problem with contemporary analysis of International Relations? As stated by my hypothesis, I believe contemporary institutions are much more affected by and have been created through the analysis and usage of old theory. In this sense, although economical trends of global analysis and other sectors of international affairs are quite updated about the world, even within theory, institutions are not. Institutions are still using the same old parameters theorists used when they first discussed international relations. For that reason, I believe using Rosenau and Kenichi’s books has a very important meaning. Both authors had innovative views of the world, and their ideas helped shape our understanding of what the world currently is like. But why weren’t their ideas used to build the tools we use to operate global governance, our institutions? Why are

9 Although, I may state, both are masterpieces!
governments, international organizations, international law and so many other institutions still trapped within conservative state centric assumptions? That takes me back to the research question. Now that we know what the problem is, the question on the reason why the world has gotten so hard to understand seems simple. The institutions we try to use to understand it and tackle its issues are just not equipped with the right analytical tools. If so, why didn’t decision makers and representatives act to comply with it? This will be more discussed as the article goes by.

For now, I want to set some ideas from the three mentioned authors, and compare them with my hypothesis, in order to build a solid theoretical outline for the research.

At first let us assess James Rosenau’s book. In order to position his work on this essay’s hypothesis, I may use three themes he chooses to explain his own theory, which are: 1) Considering this era to be a historical breakpoint; 2) Assuming a bifurcation of macro global structures into what he calls “the two worlds of world politics” and 3) focus on the micro level and the hypothesis that the analytic and emotional skills of adults in every country are increasing.

On his first claim, I may take some points into consideration. Rosenau’s work posed a very strong influence on that generation of international relations scholars. He would refer, as well as I do, to technologic advancements as tools that changed the very core of international relations, interfering on the way we would understand the decisions, phenomena, the impact they had and the actors involved. From the moment he published his book to today, two decades later, technology development increased exponentially. If Rosenau was astonished with what communications could do then, and thought that could make difference in how International Relations phenomena happened, I can only imagine what he would say after questioned on the advent of smartphones and similar technologies we have access to now. What is important to say is that the feature of being a historical breakpoint (and thereby, needing theory to update) is not so strong anymore, and not an excuse for being outdated. Other areas of knowledge have advanced and the fact that institutions are obsolete considering the world they lie in is a flaw. Why didn’t the development of institutions follow the trend started by Rosenau, then? In a fairer sentence, why are they taking so much to adapt completely? Only to state my own idea, I believe considering any era a historical breakpoint is exaggerated. It encompasses the idea that theories shape the world, and not the inverse, as theory needs to change to explain the world.

The second theme comprises a very important similarity to my own theory. Rosenau explains how the state centric world, after the two World Wars, suffers pressure from both
decentralizing and centralizing dynamics, caused by demographic and resource changes, postindustrial order changes and microelectronic revolution related changes. The still state centric world has to deal with new variables, mostly non-state variables. In this sense, after 1970, according to Rosenau, global structures change from within, by pressures of authority crises; the growth of subgroups; the weakened systems; the increased relevance of subgroups; the new regimes; the new transnational issues and the expanded analytics of individuals and officials, in order to become a divided globe, of two political worlds. A first state centric world composed of the two powers, the 3rd world, subgroups, and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. A second multi-centric world comprised of subgroups, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, state bureaucracies and transnational actors. My idea is basically the same. In my opinion, institutions do live in this first world of politics he describes. They try to deal with problems from the second world using a first-world approach. In addition, they can’t follow the advances and new opportunities the second-world raises, as they are hindered by a state-centric bias. An extra critic I pose is that although Rosenau and I use this model to explain relations within the world, nothing restricts the world itself to it. Such theoretical models are not necessarily the way the world operates exactly. There could be, for example, a multi-centric worldview and approach during ancient ages, as even the concept of a nation state is relatively new. This may be too much meta-theoretical.

On the third theme, the links between the micro and macro world occupy a central place on Rosenau’s work. He hypothesizes a continuous process of interaction between them. Then he tries to find its implications. He turns the problem of the micro-macro interaction into an opportunity. To Rosenau, focusing on the interactions between the levels enables one to get to the core of global life, to the ways in which large, impersonal forces at work in the world both derive from and influence the actions of people in coping with challenges and conducting their affairs. The micro-macro opportunity amounts to nothing less than a means for treating world affairs as the affairs of people, who aspire, fear, avoid, compete and behave in the organizations that clash and converge on the global stage. He diverges from realism and Marxism, as both consider individuals as consequences, instead of sources of macro-level institutions and collectivities. This goes along with my hypothesis, as well, as I believe the lack of new actors is the main flaw of the state-centric theory that bases the outdated institutions of the world.

After Rosenau, I may relate my hypothesis to the work of Bertrand Badie. There are, actually, three main reasons why Badie’s book is one of the sources for this article.
The first reason is that he focuses his assessment on one of the institutions I chose to study. Although a first glimpse on the fact makes you think this restricts the usage of Badie’s work, it does not. On his work, in order to criticize the way Diplomacy is understood and carried out, he goes through all of the theoretical bases and explores them to their core, in order to understand where the flaw is. On the beginning of his work, Badie argues how diplomacy, and other international related activities, still restricts the participation of individuals. He explains how this had been a trend for the whole political sphere, which democracy helped tear away. The international scenario resisted, though, and till today, individuals are yet not recognized as actors or participants of the international system’s phenomena. On Badie’s opinion, though, it is not possible, in today’s work, to limit us to a narrow definition of diplomacy, reduced to the art of interstate negotiation, under the risk of considering it outdated. He invites diplomacy, then, to become the art of responding every problem associated to the effects of separation and distinction between spaces of proclaimed sovereignty. In this sense, Diplomacy acquires the role of managing, within the international scenario, both representative functions and communication. In that case, Diplomacy becomes social, as with its actors. This kind of change, as Badie argues, poses the need to rebuild all of the view we have over whatever is international. Considering, thus, that it is undeniable that globalization forces diplomacy to attract new economic, cultural, religious and other partners; that globalization forces the state diplomats to have to develop a sociological reading of the challenges, beyond the traditional strategic readings, the challenge Badie poses is that one needs to understand why so much energy has been spent on the attempt to keep diplomacy out of this social contamination.

The second reason is the strong sociological bias of Badie’s work. He starts by citing two of the father authors who influenced international relations theoretical development, Grotius and Hobbes. Both were influenced by the happenings in their times, as expected, according to Badie. Grotius, as a counselor for the Eastern Indian Company, had developed his ideas within the context of the growth of the maritime trade. Starting from Grotius ideas, going through Durkheim, the sociological view would emphasize the importance of the civil societies and peoples, besides adopting a different, less institutionalized view of democracy.

Nonetheless, the end of the 30-Years War and the British civil war influenced Hobbes. According to Badie, what happened is that although the confrontation is still present, the ideas of the author of the Leviathan predominated. Sovereignty and powers triumphed as tools to understand a world in imminent chaos and that, thus, needed security related institutions. The Hobbesian paradigms did influence the dominant scholarship. In this sense, the created world
is a world in which order and reason are dominant, in which the Prince is granted powers over the lives of his subjects in times in which he had to deal with other Princes, always enemies, always gladiators. Still today this is the dominant vision within universities and chancelleries, although it has been developed and enriched itself with modern ideas.

According to Badie, though, the contrast of the two scholarships dominates political science, as he differs a classical realist approach and the sociology of international relations. To the extent of the hypothesis shown in this article, the sociological view is to be the most important, as it represents the institutional innovation I believe the world, the universities and the institutions need. Following Badie’s thoughts, I may expand my hypothesis to say that in case the institutions of today don’t use a sociological approach to recognize the participation of individuals within the international arena, they may be restricted to a martial and state centric view of international relations, that will certainly preclude the choice of the righteous decisions and may guide to deep flaws and mistakes within the analysis of international relations, as globalization is the reality of today’s world.

The third reason is very simple. If you consider Rosenau and Kenichi wrote about the subject we are discussing 20 years ago, you might say theory and the world should have adapted to it by now. I don’t believe so. And having Bertrand Badie write about the same issues not far from today is a strong argument to say that international relations theory and the way we address institutions and paradigms are outdated, indeed. This strengthens my hypothesis.

The last author I want to present, as one of the sources of the kind of thought that generated this article is Kenichi Ohmae. Although Kenichi’s work focuses on the economic world I have already attested has enough theoretical tools to deal with a globalized world, he poses some assumptions and challenges to that first world Rosenau draws, the world of the nation states, and his conclusions and inquisitions are very important for us to understand and draw the contribution of this article both to science and to society.

Kenichi starts by saying that traditional nation states have become unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global economy. He argues that although government leaders believed the new phenomena within the international world (including, ill-starred conventional war, a nuclear holocaust, nuclear disasters and etc.) would not affect the entities they oversaw [the nation states], they were wrong. Kenichi states the forces now at work have raised troubling questions about the relevance and effectiveness of nation states as meaningful
aggregates in terms of which to think about within economic activity. Many of the core values supporting a world order based on discrete, independent nation states, have shown themselves in serious need of redefinition or, perhaps, replacement. (Kenichi, 1996)

In order to explain a little of Kenichi’s work, let us take, for instance, the four “I’s” he uses to describe his own mind flow. The first “I” is investment. Kenichi affirms it is no longer geographically constrained. Apart from being mostly private money, investment money comes and goes where the good opportunities are, breaking the logic of having a country’s economy closed to it. Governments needn’t be involved in it anymore, even if the money comes, i.e. from pension funds of public money. This attests the freedom of choice of actors within the international arena, which means they have to be considered within international phenomena, if we consider investments to be one of the main forces of international relations, as Kenichi does.

The second “I”, industry, is also far more global in orientation today than it was a decade ago. Whilst most ideas within industry attraction may say governments attract industries by giving them tax diminishions and other benefits, Kenichi affirms corporations move to other countries because they believe there is where their future lies. On the same rationale, technology and know-how transfer are not gifts big companies give to states, but necessary tools they need to make their operation work. The meaning of this is that industry is not anymore constrained to the reasons of state, but, rather, by the desire and need to serve attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap attractive pools of resources wherever they sit. This is important to understand private actors are not subservient actors defined by what state actors tell. They are borderless agents.

The third “I”, information technology, is said to facilitate the movement of both investment and industry. What it has done, in summary, is creating the possibility of allocating capability from one place to the other without the needing of moving or creating new structures. This means a company in Oregon can control the production in Malaysia, and wherever else it is needed. The theoretical meaning of this is that there is a boost in the capability of private actors to act within international arenas, a boost states do not count

This acquires a much stronger meaning if you remember how, at a conference of leading CEOs held in Stuttgart back in 1990, Kenichi predicted that the “global logic” unleashed by these new forces would lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that moment, nobody in the room believed him. (KENICHI, 1996)
with\textsuperscript{11}. This increases the scalability of action of non-governmental actors within the international arena and means their influence can grow much faster and broader than the influence of states.

The fourth “I” is individual consumers. According to Kenichi, they have become more global as the access to information increased. In this sense, it is likely that they will become pickier to choose for the products they want, and will not care where they come from anymore, as long as they are the better options.

These four “I’s” give an overview on Kenichi’s work, and put us in a position to relate it to the given hypothesis given. The first conclusion Kenichi draws is that, within the context of these four “I’s”, viable economic units in any part of the world can pull in whatever is needed for development. They do not need to look for assistance to pools of resources close to home, nor need they rely on the formal efforts of governments to attract resources from elsewhere\textsuperscript{12}. In this sense, the “middleman” function of governments is unnecessary. This is enough material (as the works of both Rosenau and Badie are) to prove my hypothesis true. Nevertheless, I believe there are some comments to make on behalf of it, as some considerations.

Kenichi’s ideas describe very well how the new economic flows should cover the world, regardless of borders. When it comes to the institutions, though, I believe there is space for some limits on Kenichi’s ideas. Although it is known states need not be the only actors on international sphere, they need not disappear, as well. On my hypothesis, I believe, as Kenichi, the theoretical assumptions behind institutions are outdated. The solution I want to provide, though, is an expansion on the institutions’ core, not a complete extermination of borders and nations. I may state Kenichi did not forecast that, as well, but his focus on the uselessness of the state centric worldview is not compliant with the double worldview I want to provide within Rosenau’s theory, for instance.

Nevertheless, there is a scholarship that may have developed Kenichi’s idea to an insight within the institutional world, which is Benjamin Barber’s. Barber affirms that considering the international arena as an arena whereby problems have to be solved, the executive powers within nations are not the right ones to access if one wants to tackle global

\textsuperscript{11} Unless you look into smarter cities solutions designed by big corporations. They are designed to give mayors and other government representatives the tools to deal with globalization in a city scope, for instance.

\textsuperscript{12} An important remark from Kenichi’s work is how he proves states have used and needed private money to operate, since globalization.
issues effectively. This is closely related to Kenichi’s idea of a regional business unit\textsuperscript{13}. What Barber says, nonetheless, is that on shall access mayors of cities, whom he calls problem-solvers, to help tackle these global issues. If you consider cities are the battlefields where global issues are really inflicting their consequences and from where action needs to be taken, Barber’s idea makes sense. In my opinion, though, one shall not take nation states out of the equation, although, they need not be the main actors nor the only.

Another insight that may be interesting, considering Kenichi’s economical concepts on the globalized world, is Mariana Mazzucato’s. Whilst Kenichi writes for the need of states to back off from international economic chains and financial flows of investment, Mazzucato goes in the contrary way. She has studied the investments held within innovation and scientific development, highly connected to the communication technology the world created in the past decades, and concluded the nation states were the main actor within the whole process. Risk investments – the ones that have reached the cutting edge technology we brag about today – are not within the investments taken by private companies. States do fund them, though. Without the help from nation states no technological innovation would have been possible, she says. In this sense, my opinion is that far from taking states out of the international analysis equation, we have to approach the opportunities even states are taken within with a different eye. Looking at the state with an old theoretical view, even if it has an important strategic role within the international system, will not conduct to new outcomes within analysis, and will probably lead to unpredictability and theoretical flaws. If we take the state and sum it up with new actors to understand the new world we live in, there will be two paths, in my opinion. The first path will lead to the discovery that there is no analytical capacity to understand everything the world is available to produce as potential, and that there probably will not be. The second path, though, may recognize movements not yet recognized within international system analysis, like religion, social entrepreneurship, ill-dispersion, scholarships for students and social media, as important movements within the international arena, that need to be understood and considered in order to create an accurate understanding of the world, as international relations theory is supposed to. This is the contribution I want to make, and that will prove to be needed, in case my hypothesis is proven right.

The reader may criticize my theoretical approach for a global world by saying the authors I picked may probably lead to a westernized view of the world. This is right. There are limits on my approach, as well. To diminish them, though, I may state how the ideas of

\textsuperscript{13} A concept many corporations use nowadays, in change from the old nation state models and maps.
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Dambisa Moyo and Dalia Mogahed also comply with my hypothesis, in an effort to turn the chosen “biased” points of view into real insights on the world.

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is the first female Finance Minister of Nigeria. During a lecture in 2007, she described what her ministry and the government itself had been working on in order to guarantee the development of the country. Although most of what she says relates directly to what Kenichi states on his work, by drawing some nuances on Mazzucato’s ideas and the hypothesis, one may understand my point of view. To keep it simple, she describes how they privatized companies, liberalized some sectors and conducted their finances properly, in a way that the country’s economical development raised significantly, whereby also available services to people and the quality of those services grew in the same pace.

Investments came from abroad, multinational corporations were added to the roll of companies in the country, information technology became available and people started to create their own companies and choose the products they wanted. That would be an assessment if we take into account Kenichi’s work. Using Mazzucato’s point of view, though, would indicate how much of the efforts to grant this development was government inducted. The role of the state was immense, and the government, which assured the necessary stability for companies and money to come, tackled problems like corruption and the messy financial system. More than that, the existent public-private partnership, that had to deal with the international system in both global and regional scopes, is a reason to believe innovational alternatives exist for tackling old problems. The State took itself out of problems it could not deal with (it’s important to state it was not coped to do so), and let other actors take control.

Okonjo-Iweala opened the door for a new way of thinking Africa, a way that considers the opportunities within the country, considering the people inside it. This is a worldview indexes like the GDP per capita would never comply with, but that may represent the new wave of investment and entrepreneurship in the world.

The Zambian-born international economist Dambisa Moyo, chosen by Times as one of the 100 most influential people in the world, has an opinion that may also help cope with the goal of diminishing the western bias of the article. In a lecture in June, this year of 2013, Dambisa addresses a very uncommon trend, for westerners. She starts by asking whether liberal democratic states are the real solution for growing economies. Although the combination between private capitalism, liberal democracy and prioritized political rights may be a sacred mix for the western world, she says, the western world represents only 10% of the world’s population. In emerging countries, the idol of development, the model that people may be trying to seek, in her opinion, is the model of China, where state capitalism, a
de-emphasized democracy and prioritized economic rights reigns, in contradiction with the western model. People worry more about where life standard improvements come from than about whether they can or not vote. Moyo states democracy is not a pre-requisite for economic growth, although economic growth may be a pre-requisite for democracy.

Taking Moyo’s opinion into account certainly diminishes any westernized biases into the essay, especially because she directly defies the self-given authority of western States to try to spread a government model around the world. This opens doors for considerations much more related to the globalized world I am trying to describe, like the ascension of social businesses models\(^\text{14}\), the importance of public opinion, the importance of religion founded biases in public opinion, the capacity of governments to really improve life standard in the short term.

Although this seems to relate very few with the theme of the article, there is a direct reason why I chose to put it here. The first reason is that, according to Moyo, a recent study found out that the very average income of people into a country is the main reason why a democracy shall last. The higher the income average, the longer the democracy is. This explains and proves the acknowledgement of the importance of micro actors within the macro environment. By coping with Rosenau’s theory, Moyo helps bring a different view into the article, and I won’t take her idea for granted.

Dalia Mogahed, former Executive Director of Gallup’s Center for Muslim Studies and CEO of Mogahed Consulting, on a lecture in 2012, gives an assessment on what sparked the Arab Spring. Nevertheless she gives some extraordinary facts on the views of people during the Arab Springs, due to her research experience at Gallup\(^\text{15}\); there are two important facts about her lecture I want to elaborate on.

The first fact is that she goes in the opposite direction of Moyo’s theory. By showing data on people’s opinions she correlates the Arab Spring to a desire (using Egyptians’ opinions as the asset) on having freedom and democracy, in a western style.

\(^{14}\) Which are models that seek to tackle the base of the income pyramid for profit, in an effort to create social impact. (Yunus, 2008)

\(^{15}\) For instance, she concludes the rise of women’s rights in Arab countries is not related with secularization, but with human development indexes, contrary to western thoughts, which would mainly go against Islamism. Also, she describes how women’s opinions on the importance of religion on law are not related between countries. This means women’s opinions are not subjects of their condition of being women, but on their conditions as nationals. The importance of these facts is that they are concurrent with western main thoughts.
The second fact is that as she uses people’s opinions to design the upheavals on the Arab Spring, she also opens doors for a microanalysis within the macro structure, which, according to Rosenau, has to be the main source for an analytical international relations study. Again, assessments like Mogahed’s are the kind of assessment on international relations that do create understanding on the world, in a globalized environment, as we know the world is now. This relates with my hypothesis, as Moyo’s, Mogahed’s and Okonjo-Iweala’s assess the world and the international phenomena in a non-state centric way, so that their assessments are updated. They also ratify my hypothesis as they present non-state centric views in order to provide real assessments on conclusions state centric views have misunderstood, proving old state centric view to be destined to fail and to have created institutions with embedded flaws in them.

More than that, though, taking these three thoughts into consideration ensures the attempt to make this article less westernized, Eurocentric or biased in any way. I may state, though, there are constraints to this attempt, and there will probably be westernized bias in the essay, as even my own background may have been influenced by it.

Although I did state that the necessary theory to understand the world is not available yet, as the full range of interactions and possibilities of the world is too wide, I believe an attempt to use some different analytical tools is important to create at least a clearer view. In this sense, I may present what the analytical tools I want to use are, so that the reader knows what I may base upon to make my discovery process alive.

In this sense, I may briefly present five theories that I want to use to describe the world in a more innovative way. They are not enough, as well as they are not complete. They may, although, serve to goal of providing a different analysis, that encompasses more variables and possibilities than the old theoretical tools available for the analysis of international phenomena within the theme of institutions and the presented paradigms.

“I believe it has the power to end the gridlock created by conflicting ideas, which appears to be paralyzing the globalized world. Reality is so complex it is mandatory to move away from dogma.”

— Glattfelder, James B.

This quote from a TEDx Conference is about what the first theory I want to present is capable of, in the words of one of its authors. The reader should feel free to take his/her own conclusion whether Glattfelder is right or not.

16 February 2013, at the TEDx Conference in Zurich.
The first theory I want to present, then, is the Science of Complexity. (Glattfelder, Vitali, & Battiston, The network of global corporate control, 2011) A complex system is a system made up of many interconnected and interacting parts, as the individuals in the globe. Complex systems are very hard to map into mathematical equations, in a way that a quantitative analysis would be very hard to accomplish. The interesting thing is that complex behavior is actually the result of a few simple rules of interaction. In this sense, it is possible to understand the system through the interactions. Most Complex Systems also share a feature called emergence, which means the system as a whole suddenly starts to show a behavior, which cannot be understood or predicted by looking at the components of the system. So the whole is literally more than the sum of its parts. In this sense, there is opportunity to understand the system without analyzing each individual on it, but only the rules of interaction. This makes possible to use the Science of Complexity to analyze the international system with individuals as actors, as we can create networks.

Analyzing the international system as a network may open doors to discover, i.e., how to deal with potential pandemics, as we may analyze the flying patterns, or to gather information on how individuals can influence political decisions, how they share knowledge, how innovation is driven, how trade and foreign trade or financial flows go on and etc. Although this kind of analysis is not capable of providing details on individuals and their choices, it may broaden our understanding on the relation between the macro and micro spheres. It may, for example, transform diplomacy into a tool for individuals, as Badie claims in the conclusion of his book, whether individuals are aware of it or not. If we consider diplomacy to be the communications tool of the globalized world, it is mandatory to understand how the involved individuals on this network of communication interact. We can open doors for new rules of interaction and for new possibilities, as we study the network itself. The paradigms of sovereignty and actions like intervention and aid would acquire a whole different significance, as we become more aware of how individuals interact and share between themselves, and how this can impact the world. Network analysis can help us discover who or which are the hubs where individuals and decisions gather, and this can bring a new path of developing for the science of decision making. Also, it may become easier to coordinate global issues tackling as we can predict interactions and even boost interactions that can solve the issue in question.

If you take foreign policy, as decision processes are streamlined and the influences can be measured between the different involved groups and networks, there may be enough material for legitimizing procedures and solving problems. Also, the understanding of why
decisions are taken may depend less on discourse analysis and become less obscure, as the science of complexity broadens the discussion and takes systems as a whole. Systems may hold more significance than the representatives that carry them out and outcomes may involve more people, so that even international law, for example, may be operated and executed in a smoother way, with more people aware of it, as we may study how to broadcast news and laws in a more effective way.

War, security and global issues may be better tackled, as it may become possible to understand where problems come from and who or which are the hubs and the controlling individuals. I am not saying the Science of complexity has the solution for all the problems in the planet, but assuming it treats information without getting stuck on different opinions, there may be space for the generation of new insights.

Borders, the same way, may have a different significance, as we go from studying its geopolitical limits to exploring how their existence relates to the flows of people, knowledge, money and goods, as well as diseases and other interchangeable matters. Imagining the possibilities of studying individuals as networks is interesting as we may be able to, e.g., study how people’s genealogical trees may relate with their nationalities. Strategic investments may be created as new hubs are discovered, and new actors may ascend, as well.

There are limits to this kind of exploration, though. Assessments and analyzes may be too shallow and may be biased, as criteria becomes broader to analyze more and more agents and rules on the complex systems. Even with restrictions, though, Science of Complexity may be a good alternative into understanding how individuals compose the network that acts to become the international system itself, and how they are, or not, important to it.

Another theory that is important for the creation of a new assessment on international relations comes from Maria Helena de Castro Santos, or, even before, from Graham T. Allison. Although they write about very different subjects, it is interesting as both their theories have an analogue conclusion. While Allison writes about the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, Santos writes about Biofuels quarrels in Brazil, 30 years later. They both describe mechanisms of decision taking, though. Allison describes three models through which decision can be taken. Of the three, the third is going to be important to us (also because it’s the one the author identifies with). On Allison’s third model, the first premise is that there is no rational in decision-making. According to Allison, the political environment is comprised of lots of directly and not directly involved individuals, groups and organizations that discuss, quarrel and measure their influences. As debate goes by, some influences matter more, others matter less, and at the end of the discussions the decision is nothing but the
resultant force of the sum of the various different vectors, as in physics. Castro Santos, similarly, describes how important it is to identify the involved agents and to get to know what are their intentions and interests. After that, Santos states the political analyst shall infer who wins and loses with each possible outcome, on which basis it is possible to discover how the different actors will deal with the discussions. With that in mind, it is important to assess the power and influence of each involved actor and, then, it is possible to predict what the outcome will be. Nevertheless predictions are possible, the real outcome of political discussions is never known until it comes, as the political quarrels are not rational, again.

Before applying these theories to the international system I want to draw, and, more than that, to the paradigms I chose for analysis, I may make some comments on them. At first, I believe they are exaggerations on the reality. Although considering politics to be a completely rational procedure accomplished by the union of economical men is a big illusion, considering it to be completely empty of reason is also an exaggeration. The structures where the actors and organizations are embedded have rules and the interaction between them is limited at some points. In this sense, and also considering the limits posed by morals, religions, political scandals and the law, there is reason in the political decision-making process. The point, though, is to keep balance between what an economic-man rationale may bring as an outcome, and what a Hobbesian state of chaos-like decision-making process is capable of. Another insight is that, although both theories are decades old, they certainly are not the way mainstream theory looks upon decision-making process. In this sense, they are innovative, as they represent the other side from the most used theory, and, thus, balance is required to create innovation.

In this sense, as we analyze the international globalized world, especially as we put the two different worlds described by Rosenau at stake, figuring out how decision making processes work can be surprising. Whilst the first world is opened up by the emergence of actors not considered before, and outcomes as the keeping of subsidies or the giving of scholarship money overseas becomes more lucid, the second world may look like what a stock exchange room in 1940’s Wall Street looked like, complete chaos, risk taking and few input data decision-making. What I mean is that, as it is known from the corporate world, most decisions are made with less information than needed. Therefore, there is high risk in almost every decision, and, beyond that, as information is not the same for every actor involved of the discussion, there are quarrels, there is deceiving and there is bribery. There is also fruitful discussion and most of the involved people are probably well intended during decision-making processes. Knowing this, though, comes handy as we describe international
chambers of decision-making, for example the UN and the WTO. After imagining how the discussions go on and concluding they are not as rational as theory makes it look like, it seems logic that most documents and treaties do not pose significant changes or obligations to any of the parts. It also opens the mind for the new opportunities, as new actors may get involved and influence the procedures. Even demonstrations outside of those chambers start making sense, and cases like the Blood Diamonds case or the Kony 2012 viral videos around the web seem more likely to happen and to make difference, as we imagine the representative teams and involved institutions are comprised of people as that can be influenced by those activities.

If we take diplomacy, then, under analysis, there is much to infer about it under this new sphere of analysis. At first, as we take the usual actors into stake, this different point of view brings some new insights into the diplomacy formulation process. At first, it becomes mandatory to consider the many national involved actors in order to understand diplomacy made by representatives abroad. In this sense, diverse ministries, foreign affairs councils within national organizations, corporations and civil society representatives have influence over the diplomacy held for representatives. In this sense, the diplomat must both make a sociological analysis of the needs of the country, rather than a strategic only analysis, and comply with the democratic (or not democratic) methods of decision-making within the country. In this sense, diplomatic communication is much more legitimate, and much more mistake-proof, as well. The embedded problem is that this assessment makes it mandatory that the diplomat is aware of all of this. In some, maybe even most of the cases, the diplomat will not be. In this sense, the representative may draw diplomacy as commanded by higher authorities and/or his own opinions on the needs of the country, depending on how much empowered he or she is to do that. To counter that, it would be clever to create a pool of decisions or even analysis of big data on the opinions and needs of different instances of national administration and private actors (as submitting every decision to keen analysis by several representatives and other actors would be time-consuming), in a way that diplomats can be backed by analysis done over real concerns and needs from different actors, so that the discussion is simulated and they are able to take better decisions.

On another way of viewing it, namely Badie’s theory, private actors and individuals are part of diplomacy, whether they are aware of that or not. Considering the decision-making process described, the ones aware of it would most likely, but not necessarily, influence diplomacy and their countries’ effectiveness on the international arena. In addition, the discussion process behind decisions would enrich itself, as unrecognized actors are put into
jeopardy, as their beliefs and interests can be better screened and subjects of other instances’ analysis. The real process, though, is not making them part of it (although that may be needed in some cases), but making them aware of it and recognizing their already existent contribution, in order to create possibilities for the micro-macro analysis proposed by Rosenau, and to boost the effectiveness of actions as to Kenichi.

Analyzing the effects of diplomacy on the abroad arena, as well, reveals new insights as the balanced decision-making process is considered. Conjuncture, for example, becomes a wider concept, as it may include public opinion as a main actor, and, surprisingly, as one of the main assets of diplomats, as they can be used to improve the effectiveness of impact of decisions, as media can be used to broadcast whatever diplomats say.

Foreign Policy, on its side, follows the same rational used to understand the creation of Diplomacy under the new decision-making theory, although the outcomes must be broadened to cover more than communication, to become the reflection of a country’s own quarrels and disputes, in an attempt to become a single voice. The question I want to pose is: Why does a country need a single voice? We have already considered the importance of dispute to build policy. Why then, should so many actors agree to narrow their opinions to a single blow if the world encompasses so many possibilities and still uncovered interaction potential? One might argue that international discussion and governance chambers are not for undecided actors, but why do the decisions held in those places need single representatives? Is not one of the main problems of the discussion on those chambers the absence of some important players? What if countries were not required to act solely?

This question is far beyond an irrational desire for decentralization, though. It goes to the very core of the political decisions held both within a country and to its capability to hold them abroad. If one remembers the first assumptions of this essay, it may become clearer. The balanced decision-taking theory is not a suggestion on how the decisions should be taken, but a perceived better explanation on how decisions are actually held. This means foreign policy building is not a process held by sole representatives. This also means international treaties are not created after rational debate by enlightened prime ministers and diplomats. Although comprised by structures, the conjuncture and the emergence of private or individual actors already make difference to both mentioned spheres. This is proved by the power of lobbying, for example. The path, then, goes from suggesting a new way to do policy, to broadening the perception of how policy is made. This explains, for instance, why international decisions held by state centric based institutions are not always, to say the least, successful. It also explains, though, why foreign policy building has invited so many private actors to comprise
its walls, in the last years (the US, the BRICS and others can serve as good examples), as institutional innovation within national governments has been learning to consider more actors faster than international governance institutions.

When it comes to war, security and other global issues, as well, a decision-making process as this one certainly raises concerns, as well as opportunities. If one considers old mainstream approaches, for instance, security issues become of most importance, as well as International Relations is turned into the science of war. In this world, weapons of mass destruction are some of the most important assets a country can have, as well as national defense research and development, along with strategic geopolitical action becomes a priority both within budget planning and execution. A country is a gladiator within a roman plaza, and must be prepared to fight at every moment. In case one takes this as the basis where countries interact, a decision-making as mentioned would be too dangerous to deal with. It wouldn’t make sense, as the State, in the roman example, is to be an organism, a single actor. Nonetheless, we already know that this is simply not true. States are not sole actors that can take their decisions apart from conjuncture or other actors’ (even national actors) opinions. States are part (an important part, though) of what countries are, and they are composed of several actors, their opinions and the structure they are comprised within. In this sense, internal negotiation, following the balanced decision-making theory I described before, regarding subjects like security and war, acquire a much higher level of complexity. War, at a first glimpse, may probably fade away, flooded by other security issues that go much beyond WMD issues. For example, food security issues, diseases and pandemics related security issues, privacy issues, as the ones created by the espionage of the NSA agency, recently uncovered by Snowden and other activists, along with many others, gather evidence in the international arena, as simple actions perpetrated by individuals are acknowledged as possible international phenomena. A decision-making process that includes risk-taking and little information availability is, though, still a preoccupation. How should an international analyst explain those issues under the light of a balanced decision-making process?

Although the trend is to say it would be the same process as the process considered in the building of diplomacy, as security issues usually require a fast analysis and faster action, it is true to say that they should be handled by fewer actors, as if the State could take responsibility for acting, as it controls, by law, the logistic chains, the armies, information flows and etc. This does not mean, though, that the building of the State’s decisions has to be

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17 Especially because no country has developed first-strike weapons. They are unusable assets.
made within an oval office. Planning and strategy are to be built the same way any political
decision goes into the country, and this is not new, as, e.g., medical industries and food
producers hold a big power on lobby within most countries, and help shape political
decisions, the way the described decision-making process works. The needed action, though,
is to recognize them as part of this political process, and as well as part of the equation on
international phenomena. State representatives, alone, would probably not be able to take any
decisions regarding, i.e., information security issues, a problem clearly stated by the security
problem the world faces right now.

If you take global issues tackling, as well, you will find that state centric strategy is
seldom the answer to any issue. Benjamin Barber’s work complies with this, as he says
allowing mayors to take control on global issues tackling is the only way to be effective. In
my opinion, both regional actors, in a decentralization effort, and the States, should gather,
and be part of the equation, as States do control important assets, although they may not have
enough capability for dealing with global issues in a proper way.

On the subject borders, the important discussion sets on the new possibilities for
diplomacy governance. For instance, as borders acquire a much broader significance in the
globalized world, the first appearance is the new assets to encompass into law. Information
flows, foreign trade, immigration, all the variables that would be analyzed differently within a
Complex Systems’ analysis, have to be dealt with in political instances as well. Knowing how
these political decisions take place is, thus, an important asset. The new aspect of this is,
though, that political decisions about borders, regarding all of the variables above, is that the
individuals comprised by the border issues may be part of the discussion held, whether it is
carried out nationally or not. Immigrants may have voice over immigration political decisions,
as companies become more active considering foreign trade decisions. As Badie said,
individuals become part of the international system and gather importance within it, as
problems and issues can be reported to the whole world in an instantaneous click. More than
that, the micro-macro relation becomes broader as foreigners become eligible to discussions
not related to their countries, as active actors. Gordon Brown cites an important example
during a speech delivered in 2009, when bloggers around the world changed their addresses to
Teheran, Iran, in order to make it difficult for the Iranian security agency to find who the
dissident bloggers talking about the repression and prosecution going on in the country were.
Individuals made the difference and precluded State action, within an international
phenomenon, ignoring the borders.
The third theory I want to present is the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, created by Daniel Isenberg, from Babson College. Although Isenberg had created the model to explain how entrepreneurs could take action within their societies and improve entrepreneurship chains by improving their success rates, I believe the model is a good example on how an individual can become an international actor.

In his model, Isenberg describes how an entrepreneurial ecosystem consists of financial institutions, educational institutions, government assistance, other enterprises, networking agencies, universities, investors and other instances, and how improving these instances alone can augment the chances of creating new entrepreneurs, and enhancing their success rates. In this sense, entrepreneurship is not only a function of the entrepreneurs’ sole capacity to create and innovate, but also of the ecosystem around him. Also, action can and must be taken in order to improve this ecosystem. This means a macro ambience improvement, which may create opportunities for micro agents.

Rosenau can be used to explain two of the assumptions here. The first is that the capacity of the actor to act by himself, and become an actor. Rosenau argues the improved intellectual and social capacity of individuals is a major reason why they entered the international system. One may see this fact as a consequence of the possibility of using modern communications, though. This does not invalidate Rosenau’s assumption, although it opens space for the model created by Isenberg. The emergence of a better-prepared ecosystem enhances the chances individuals will become entrepreneurs, or, in our case, act within the international system. The second is the micro-macro relation. Within an entrepreneurial ecosystem, organizations may acknowledge the emergence of individual actors and act within macro structures in order to enhance the quality, quantity and success rate of individual action. The same can be made with the international system. Rosenau acknowledges this, as he understands that in case state centric institutions recognize the emergence of individuals, they may be more capable of taking advantage of their action, besides being able to work in order to improve it by improving the ecosystem itself.

On diplomacy, we may get back to Badie, as he states individuals are channels of diplomacy within their single actions of interacting with the world. One can predict, then, that an individual friendly ecosystem can boost the action of those extra-official diplomats. The model, at first, explains how an individual gets to action. He is made aware of the possibilities; he interacts with other individuals globally, gets mentored by better educational institutions and is triggered by international phenomena the same ecosystem makes him think he is capable of dealing with, of making the difference. Then he acts. The model, then, opens
doors for understanding that shaping this ecosystem can both boost and restrain individual action on the international arena. One might keep in mind that once individuals are made aware of possibilities, and tools are given to them, the chain of events that boosts individual participation within international phenomena can hardly be stopped, as proven by viral videos and movements like Kony 2012.

Applying this same model to Foreign Policy, there are two possible insights. The first insight is to consider the possibility of participation of individuals on national building of foreign policy. Again, the same rules proposed on diplomacy are valid. The more developed the ecosystem is, the more individual action may apply on it. National discussion, however, implies a bigger assessment on the capacity of individuals to take part on political decisions. Although I have said foreign policy needs to take on sociological research before becoming a decision, and have also stated the importance of every related actor within the policy construction, it is possible that the individual participation restricts to the sphere of public opinion. In such a case, the ecosystem serves more as a trigger for collective action than a tool for individual entrepreneurship. One possibility does not preclude the other, though, and individuals may take part on foreign policy decision-making whenever they are granted the tools and made aware of their own capability, as they feel prepared for it. The second insight lies in the execution of foreign policy within the international arena. Nevertheless the state is to be the main voice on the decided foreign policy (which may have already been influenced by individuals and by a balanced decision-making theory), the entrepreneurial ecosystem opens space for other individuals and institutions to act wherever they feel (and are empowered to by the same ecosystem) they are needed or they can be of help or influence. Although the ecosystem does not add to the relevance of actors in the international arena, it does help to explain how this micro-macro interaction can take place.

If we take war, security and global issues tackling as the paradigm, though, the ecosystem takes a different shape. On one hand, as security (and by security I mean a broad synthesis, which encloses food security, resources security, privacy, terrorism and other security issues) issues are often taken secretly or handled with more proximity by governments, there is very few stimuli to the development of the ecosystem. On global issues, as well, the same problem applies. As governments feel responsible for dealing with them, even modern communications are not enough stimuli to massive action by individuals. This does not preclude every kind of action from the private/individual world, though. It does make it harder, and most people have a very hard time broadcasting the need of action on such issues, but the emergence of NGOs like Global Witnesses and The International
Amnesty are living proof that some entrepreneurs gather and try to act. Those NGOs play a very important role, and some have become very big and international. They do not, though, possess enough power to tackle global issues or to make international participation within security a standard, though. In this sense, there is no accurate analysis one can draw, although the ascension of some of them has helped increase the awareness on some issues, and thus, developed the ecosystem and boosted the creation of other NGOs, like what happened with Greenpeace, which became a giant.

If you apply the model to borders, we have an interesting explanation for individual action throughout international expansion of corporations, the ascendance of born-global enterprises, immigration and knowledge sharing through student exchanges. Business accelerators, student exchange facilitators and other institutions, boost all of those. This helps understanding how the entrepreneurship ecosystem works. Also, it helps understand how individuals can create relationship with other individuals abroad, and develop, as Kenichi says, greater empathy for foreigners that share the same culture or religion, for example, than for nationals that share the same flag. Religious movements may as well become more rational, if we take their morals and needs of expansion as triggers of the ecosystem, which empowers individuals to be fearless of outcomes and to act even if there are difficulties as language barriers, visa costs of cultural diversity. Sometimes, the very existence of borders can serve as enough a stimulus for an individual to undertake international action.

The entrepreneurial ecosystem has, thus, the exact opposite role of the Science of Complexity, as it seeks to explain the path through which individuals become actors on the international world. The Complex System approach, on the other hand, aims to understand what the outcomes of individuals actions are, despite the way they become international actors.

The last theoretical model I may present, in order to provide enough tools for a better understanding of the globalized world we live in, is a very simple model created by Stanley Hoffman. Although it is a very simple model, Hoffman’s model is important to facilitate the understanding of the world, as it comes from and counters two ideas that come from mainstream theory, which are the three-dimensional chess game and the zero-sum game theory. The first comes from neoliberal theorist Joseph Nye. The second is a premise for classical realist approaches.

In Oxford, by 2010, Nye described his idea of the world’s power distribution as being a big three-dimensional chess game. On the top board, there is the military power among states. The US is the only superpower, and it is likely to remain that way for two or three
decades. China’s not going to replace the US on this military board. The middle board of this three dimensional chess game is economic power among states. Power is multipolar. There are balancers, like the US, Europe, China, Japan, they can balance each other. The bottom board of the three-dimensional chess game, the board of transnational relations, things that cross borders outside the control of governments, things like climate change, drug trade, financial flows, pandemics, all the things that cross borders outside the control of governments. There is nobody I charge. It makes no sense to call this unipolar or multipolar. Power is chaotically distributed. Although Nye’s description is very lucid, I believe Kenichi, Rosenau and Badie’s ideas would go strongly against it. For many reasons, starting from assuming a state centric conformation of international relations, to putting the economical and financial flows as a subject of security and war, to considering economic relations to be multipolar, and, thus, state centric, to denying the importance of micro-macro relations within international relations, and so on.

The zero-sum game theory is the idea that any dispute within states, power or economics, has negative outcomes for the losers. In this sense, if one wins, the other loses, as the sum of the outcomes must be zero. This model is too simple to explain the reality, as most of the interactions in the globalized world are positive sum games. Kenichi describes very well how corporations can add value to the administration of cities or states, for instance, and this is only a small slice. If you analyze through Badie’s theory, even a single person can be benefited from interactions with other persons around the world, and benefit as well those other people, making from interactions positive sum games.

Deriving from the neoliberal model of Nye, than, and countering the zero-sum game theory, Hoffman describes the world as a multiple chess game. Not a three or four dimensional, but maybe a million dimensional chess game, each one with different rules, players and objectives. This way it is possible to explain multiple interactions of several actors within the international system, and even comply with Isenberg, Santos, Allison and Glattfelder’s theory. Throughout Hoffman’s model, though, it’s easy to infer the interactions represented by the chess games are always competitions. I may propose some tuning on this fact, though, as I believe not all interactions are competitions, but several of them are cooperation, negotiation, benchmarking, and philanthropy and etc. The fewer chess pieces each player loses, the better. It matters very little who checkmates. The fewer lost pieces, the more the interaction configures itself as cooperation, instead of battle. This way it is easier to see the world as a big market, full of possibilities for infinite agents. This way it is easier to describe international relations, as different outcomes and actors are more accurately
described in the metaphor. They act differently and achieve different outcomes; after all, not all of the chess players are good players.

Taking diplomacy, what kind of innovation or insight appears as a possibility after the new model is applied? The first thing is that the extra official diplomats, described by Badie, the individuals, are found an arena to act. This means more than understanding they have impact on global decisions and communication, but providing a theoretical model for analyzing how this diplomacy goes on. Diplomacy goes from a single board with 200 players to thousands of boards each with an unpredictable number of players. Does this derail analysis capability on diplomacy? No. The main change is that phenomena not yet considered, or actors still not accounted for becoming part of the equation, and, then, the probable outcome is that analytical efforts may become more comprehensive and, thus, more lucid. If you consider the other theories I presented beforehand, the conclusion is that, instead of becoming harder or less detailed/analytic, studies will become different. Other variables will be at stake; other kinds of theoretical conclusions and other roles shall be discovered. Papers shall come in format of complex system or ecosystem analysis, instead of discussions on decisions from single representatives. An important point is that considering the multiple chess game, new drawn boards can be analyzed with the same detail the three-dimensional chess game is to be analyzed today. There is much work to do, then.

Moving to Foreign Policy, a globalization-friendly macro understanding of decision-making process is made possible as the multiple chess game is drawn. This is due to the overview that the model creates. If one understands a political process as part of many discussions and to be the outcome of it, besides the microanalysis provided by Santos’ work, there is space for inputting new variables, derived from globalization, into the process that is already mapped. More than that, when it comes to the international arena, it becomes easier to link different discussions, issues and outcomes, as all of them are comprised of different chess games, and as outcomes and discussions are expected to influence other outcomes and discussions, interconnectedness becomes visible, although complex. One of the important assets that is created, thus, is that as several chess games are considered, the micro-macro relation that forms international phenomena can finally be assessed, as the model recognizes both as parts of the outcome. Besides the approach under Rosenau’s micro-macro relation importance theory, though, as the zero-sum games are considered not to be the standard of all relations within international relations, foreign policy may admit collaboration in a deeper level, as different actors (governmental or not) can gather to work together and/or compete within the same chess games, and these can be zero sum, positive sum or negative sum
games. Political analysis, besides becoming a matter of understanding the involved variables, structures, possible outcomes and interests, and mixing all up together, becomes multiple, as various political process can go on at the same time.

Bringing the discussion to war, security and global issues, the first thing to assess is the three-dimensional chess game drawn by Nye. In that model, military and war subjects had a bigger importance, and, therefore, would be represented by a first level of the chess game, which did not have space for different actors like the non-governmental actors the globalized world empowers to become international agents. In this sense, and having presented my opinion on how governments should take responsibility on action regarding security issues, what would the usage of a multiple chess game model? The usage of such model comes to stake as we understand that although governmental actors shall take responsibility for execution, they are not alone on planning and preparing whatever actions and policies are to become the countries’ security strategy. Corporations are to be involved on the manufacturing processes, consulting firms in the strategy making, single actors on the training of preparing of armies, and all of this, as we are not considering other security threats. If we consider disease conducted security threats, water management or food security issues to be on stake, a much bigger range of non-governmental actors comes to action, and their incomes have to be understood under the frame of a multiple chess game model. Said that, we have implicitly accepted two assumptions: the first is that there are some chess games that are more important than others. This is true, and beyond, the importance of the chess game depends not only on the subject it is about, but also on the individual actors (or the systemic impact of that group of actors) within the international system. A second assumption is that security actions may be dealt with by leaving the multiple chessboard frameworks. This does not mean, though, that political decisions on security subjects is dealt with outside of the model, although one shall accept that the relative power of governments within the international system is not to be neglected and, as expected, may take control over action, as expected from them. At this point, I may, again, state that the globalized world has to be considered under new theories. Nevertheless, these new theories do not necessarily take the state out of the commanding position on some subjects, although the entrance of new actors is important and may change the balance, outcomes or analysis over the international system.

On global issues, the outcome is not different. The new insight is that offering different actors the chance to discuss and act within the multiple chess board game opens doors for the achievement of solutions outside the jurisdiction or without help from the state. This is not mandatory. The point is that this possibility is to be taken into account. In this
sense, solutions for global issues can come from cities, individuals, states, policy, discussion on international organizations or any other instance the new globalized world considers, as we open the theoretical approach for the multiple chessboard model.

Borders related discussion, once the multiple chessboard frameworks are applied, also acquires new possibilities. The most significant of, nonetheless, is that non-nationals can be part of the chess game related to national quarrels, and this opens space for a whole new range of international phenomena. As people become aware of their capability to ignore borders, national concerns at some points may become international as public opinion tackles them, and the chessboard game model helps understand that. Mostly in cases of human rights issues, as we know by now, or climate change related discussions, individuals and their own opinions have acquired the power to gather together and discuss. Their influence capacity derives both from individual capacity encompassed by each member (everything changes if Bill Gates, for example, is part of a group), but also from the strength of the group, in the so-called feature of emergence. The edge between national issues and international phenomena becomes fluid, then, and a new set of action from related actors becomes urgent. As they need to concern with actors that were not planned to be part of the discussion. The logical consequence is an empowerment of public opinion as an influence on both national and international politics, economics and societies.

Having presented four different analytical tools that should be used to provide a keener understanding of the possibilities of the globalized world, and, more than that, that can be used to understand the real role and needed reform on the institutions we live by, a challenge poses. How does the world look like with the different analytical tools all applied? What are the differences between this current world and past ones? Why does this new analysis understand a globalized world better, for institutions?

Having taken into account the three main sources’ ideas and theories, the first conclusion is that theory is not enough prepared to deal with the new world order brought by the globalized world. This would be a stupid conclusion, though. At first, the ideas of Kenichi and Rosenau, the triggering ideas for this article, are 20 years old. It’s not that the world changed enough to make them outdated, on the contrary, they were triggers for much more theoretical development and during these 20 years the available theoretical pool increased exponentially, in order to cover the new possibilities driven by the globalized world. New technological development, however, as happened in the 1990’s, has created much more possibilities and raised the interaction possibilities even more. Content analysis, big data, cloud computing, smarter cities administration and several other technological developments
are today’s trending topics, as they shape the role of representatives, the power of policies and the value of individuals, and theory is on its way to adapt. Theory will always be one step behind the world, and, thus, this is not something to concern.

Nevertheless, the institutions that act in order to keep governance of the world, as said before, have been created with enough tools and roles to act in a world that had not been explained yet. In order words, they have been planned to deal with problems and actors that no longer are the main actors of the international system. They are based on an outdated theory and, thus, cannot be expected to be able deal with a world they were not created to deal with. The structure whereby they are used, though, expects that. International organizations and the roll of institutions that govern the world, the nations and people’s lives are expected to come up with solutions and govern the world. They try that. Institutional Innovation is a constant within those institutions’ chambers, but even this innovation is conditioned to the structure they are comprised within and, thus, is not going to be enough innovation to make them become properly prepared.

This is the reason why I chose two old critic ideas to cope with. I believe the institutions of our globalized world still need to learn the lessons the other sectors of the world learned from these authors. In order to prove my point, then, I chose Badie’s work. Badie criticizes one of the paradigms I put into stake in a very incendiary way, using ideas very close to those presented by Rosenau and Kenichi. In this sense, the very existence of Badie’s critics is a proof of the righteousness of my hypothesis, somehow.

In this sense, as one accepts the condition of the world institutions and complies with the hypothesis I gave, very few solutions arise. Those institutions are part of an international structure that is not likely to change (Nye, 2010). The roles of representatives, the theory that continues to be generated to explain and help them thrive throughout history, the expected outcomes and solutions, they will remain for a long time, they are part of how today’s world organizes, and even part of the ecosystem I drew before to explain how individuals may get into action. There are two paths, then.

The first is to try to figure out a way to change the very core of those institutions, in order to make them compliant with the world they lie in. The first comment is that a political effort like this would probably take years of discussion and adaptation to happen, even considering the participants of each of the institutions were willing to do so. It is much more complex than just opening doors for actors other than states. Decision-making procedures, signed treaties and international operations, for example, would all have to be completely recreated. More than that, new problems would probably arise from a different governance
structure, if one dares to create it. How come anybody expect, i.e., 7 billion people to be part of a decision process? It is not feasible.

The second option, which I like more, requires one to think of, firstly, the two worlds described by Rosenau. The first insight is that the two worlds need to recognize the existence and importance of the other. The next one is that they both influence each other. In this sense, winding up, what we have is, at the first world, a structure comprised of all of the actors of the globalized order, but in which states are the representatives, and in the second world, the same actors, but state bureaucracies serving as part of the equation to understand international relations, instead of ruling it. This is what Rosenau drew 20 years ago, though. In that sense, and as Rosenau poses a question mark on what this scenario would build up to become, I believe Badie has got a good answer for it. Empowered individuals have already started taking places and influencing on these institutions. This is as true as the institutional innovation going on in many of them. Institutions try to adapt, as adaptation seems mandatory, and it seems mandatory as individuals gather importance and start influencing them, to a point in which there has to be organized work into it. In this sense, a mix between the two worlds, where they coexist and fight, cooperate and thrive to understand each other, can answer Rosenau’s question mark, thus. Development within this very situation is expected to continue, and, then, the analytical tools I provided may be important both for institutions and other instances of the international system to better explain how phenomena happen. The main difference, then, between an analysis made before the acknowledgement of individuals as actors within international relations, and one made after it, regarding institutions, is the weight of institutions within global governance. As they become a part of the international action that goes on, they are derailed from their role to be governance, to become part of it, and, thus, are demanded to learn how to take action, and be effective. They are demanded, though, to use different tools for analysis.

In this sense, an important asset of institutions is the capacity of understanding the world, besides their own operational procedures, an effort that requires the involved participants to acknowledge the emergent importance of different actors, and that has the power to improve their effectiveness. That taken into account, my idea is that, understanding structures is not likely to change, one needs obsolete institutional tools to adapt through acknowledgment of the new features of the world. In this sense, an international institution, in the contemporary world, is demanded to understand the details behind the speech of each of the representatives. It is demanded to know the consequences their actions can trigger, and to accept that individual and non-governmental actors can influence them and their participants.
It is not a big political change, practically speaking, although it is a very important adaptation that can be the final edge between a failed institution and an operational and useful one.

If that is right, the expectable change within institutions is to be seen on their analyses of the world, its problems and possible solutions (and, thus, the political action they may urge). Institutions would start understanding the world through the usage of tools like the ones I presented, for instance. This means economical assessments from WTO should include Complex System analyzes, as well as Climate Change problems descriptions should include the Ecosystems of organizations and individual empowerment tools that can urge individuals, cities, other institutions and governments to act. Treaties should consider the opinions and influence held by non-state actors, instead of only letting they operate behind the stage, as well as a more efficient usage of interactions made possible my multiple chessboards game framework becomes a possibility. Different institutions would be able to relate to other institutions, and interact with individuals and feed from their opinions and knowledge, as well as policies can be better planned to achieve more as the understanding of the Complex Systems in the world grows.

There are, for sure, limits on the tools I provided. They were not, however, supposed to address every kind of international issue, especially after presenting a world in which the possibility of interaction achieves a point in which theory cannot follow anymore. They are supposed, though, to give a better understanding of what kind of path one should follow in order to increase that understanding, and they are tools institutions can easily develop and adapt to.
Chapter 3

A few methodological concerns

In order to capture the process used to create the research and to make sure any other international analyst can assess my conclusions and test my hypothesis, I will make some comments on the used methodology.

The first thing to know about this article is that the basic methodology used to organize the problem and understand it was process tracing. I chose it because process tracing involves the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. The central concern, then, is with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesized causal processes. I looked for observable implications of the hypothesized explanation, often examining evidence at a finer level of detail or a lower level of analysis than that initially posited in the relevant theory. The goal was to establish whether the events or processes within the case fit those predicted by alternative explanations. Process tracing was able to provide inferential leverage on the problem, as it helped discover the connections between each phase of the macro process I analyzed.

Process tracing showed itself, thus, as the perfect methodological tool to help describe the problem I drew and hypothesize within it. There are two reasons why it fit so well. The first is that once it allowed descriptive inference into the research question, hypothesizing became possible. As the variables and described phenomena stand in the theoretical world, there was a need for causal inference, and process tracing would accept it. The second is the existence of non-quantitative hypothesis testing tools, which I was able to use to test the hypothesis. This case I used hoop tests and smoking gun tests, which, together, ensure the validity of the hypothesis. A hoop test is a test that eliminates the hypothesis in case it fails it, although passing on it does not confirm whether it is true or not. A smoking gun test, on the contrary, does not eliminate a hypothesis if it fails, however, if it passes it, it is confirmed to be true. In this sense, if a hypothesis passes both tests, it is proved to be true. Kenichi,
Rosenau and Badie’s theories and insights provided the empirical evidence I needed to conclude the tests both through their theories and through their conclusions. I drew, then, three maps to explain the research question and my hypothesis.

The first map (figure 1) is a simple photograph of the world as it is now, as I see it. Using empirical data from the three mentioned sources, I created a chronological process-tracing map to be described as follows. Starting from Rosenau’s work, I describe a world in which International Relations Theory, which I will call the Old IR Theory, is depicted and used by people to understand the world they live in (their Worldviews), to understand International Relations Phenomena (IR Phenomena) and the recognize the actors involved (IR Actors). This Old IR Theory serves as the base for the planning and creation of the institutions related to the international system. As Rosenau sees it, though, globalization related processes and, especially the development of new technology within information sciences and communication, changes the way Worldviews, the IR Phenomena and the IR Actors act within the world, creating a new Reality, which derives from the changes Globalization triggered. The biggest change, though, is the new autonomy of other actors over state centric related institutions. On Rosenau’s thoughts, though, there had not been enough development of new theories to address this world. Kenichi supports this conclusion from
Rosenau and, more than that, states these changes and the reality recreated by the changed variables (Worldviews, IR Phenomena and IR Actors), do shape the world despite of States or state centric based institutions. They both are in a 20-year-old world, though. When we put this scenario in the contemporary world, what we see is a clear development of a New IR Theory, which should be able to tackle the absence Rosenau found, but that, according to Badie, still cannot reach (or has very limited influence over) the Institutions created by the Old IR Theory, which are expected to deal with the World Reality that Globalization shapes.

The second map (figure 2) is a deep dive into the problem I found. If one looks at the first map, questions may arise whether there is or not a problem within the fact that Institutions are influenced by state centric views. A first glimpse would attach this feature to the need of streamlining processes of decision-making and, thus, no problem would exist. Therefore, the second map is important. It is also a deeper analysis on Badie and Kenichi’s work. The first description it encompasses is the update of Worldviews, IR Phenomena understanding and the recognizing of IR Actors through Globalization. They all acquire new significance, reach and potential as Globalization entails its new paradigms. They do shape what people and entities think of the world, how they act upon it and how they assess the phenomena in the international arena. According to Kenichi and Badie, this is a reality. Badie,
nonetheless, also describes how outdated institutions\(^\text{18}\), as they are expected to provide global governance, restrict the reach of those updated variables, as they both do not understand the new variables and they try to treat them with a state centric *modus operandi* and preclude the fulfillment of their potential as they lack tools to help, act and support properly. New IR Theory, though, and Badie supports this view, has limited influence over those institutions. This is proved once one acknowledges their efforts to provide institutional innovation. The New IR Theory, yet, as it provides a New Approach for Institutions (whether this approach reaches institutions or not), amends Worldviews, IR Phenomena understanding and the recognizing of IR Actors, as those variables seize new possibilities and increase in size, interactivity and complexity.

The third map (figure 3) represents my approach on what can be done to improve institutions’ awareness and actions towards the globalized world. As stated before, there is very few chance institutions can be changed to their core as to improve their procedures and understanding of the new paradigms of the globalized world. In this sense, I mentioned four analytical tools that can help improve this awareness, despite the state centric basis

\(^{18}\) Created by Old IR Theory and very few influenced by New Approaches derived from New IR Theory
institutions hold. Said that, the map describes how, according to the aforementioned analyses, Globalization impacts people’s Worldviews, the IR Phenomena and IR Actors. Having impacted the Old IR Theory, a new, Globalization compliant IR Theory is developed. This theory provides, besides new concepts of Institutions, new analytical tools. As we understand we can’t change Institutions to their very core, it is feasible to use those new analytical tools to provide both information and plan action for them. In this sense, they can be adapted to the globalized world as those analytical tools are capable of doing so.

Having gone through this three-way path at analyzing the problem, I was able to create a hypothesis to address the research question. According to the Process Tracing technique, the best way to test this hypothesis, having evidence handy, is to pass it through Hoop and Smoking Gun tests. I developed, then, one series of tests of each kind for testing the hypothesis.

The two developed Hoop Tests are:

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19 As it opens people’s minds to their potential of interaction, and for the capacity they have to be part of the world, in all instances.
20 As new phenomena may emerge, and they may not always include the participation of States.
21 This happens as individuals and other micro actors are recognized as participants of the international system.
22 Complex Systems Analysis, Multiple Chessboard games frameworks, balanced rational decision-making model and the entrepreneurial ecosystem are the ones I chose.
23 Research Question: Why did the world contemporary phenomena become so hard to understand and predict?
issues tackling, and often require further studies after signings. the main variables of world problems anymore.

The two developed Smoking Gun Tests are:

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In a theoretical scheme, thus, the hypothesis seems right. As I affirm the derived paradigms are outdated, though, there is a need for a more profound analysis on them, in order to prove their compliance to the hypothesis and, thus understand its relation with the world and validity for empirical implementation. To accomplish this, rather than again stating their condition, I may try to discover what the main reasons for this condition are. In this sense, I may analyze the paradigms of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War & Global Issues and Borders in order to discover whether they relate to the hypothesis and prove themselves outdated or not. On the same assessment, I will try to figure out what the main cause for the condition is. For this to happen I created a causal diagram in which some variables will be assessed and then, having the results from all four paradigms, I will apply Przeworski’s method in order to make up conclusions.

The first task, then, is to define which variables will serve the objective of testing the compliance of the four paradigms regarding the hypothesis. As the idea is to measure whether
they are or not updated\textsuperscript{24} regarding the globalized world, the dependent variable will be the Need for Update. In this case, a Yes would mean the paradigm’s condition is harmful, incoherent or insufficiently developed to tackle and/or deal with the world as it is expected to. A No, on the other hand, means there is no need for any changing and the paradigm is already able to address all aspects of a globalized world.

There will be, as well, an Intervenient Independent Variable, to serve as a bridge or confirmation for the Dependent Variable’s assessment, from the Principal Interdependent ones. Its role is to assess whether the input generated by the Independent Principal Variables really impacts the Dependent Variable, and, thus, it will be the Impact of New Actors in Decisions, put there to assess whether the Existence of New Actors as an Independent Principal Variable really accounts for the necessity of update. It’s an important assessment as the entrance of new actors in the international arena or within a specific institution or paradigm may not grant them importance or provide them decision-making power. In this sense, this power is to be proven by a simple assessment on the generated interaction potential, as explained by the tools presented in the last chapter.

There will be three Independent Principal Variables. Their role is to provide the main evidence on the Need for Update assessment, and, thus, they will measure, firstly, the Existence of New Actors, as this is the first link proposed by Rosenau, theorizing on the micro-macro relation and its importance; existing Institutional Innovation experiences, as those experiences represent a last resource driven by institutions in order to adapt, and thus, reveal a Need for Update, and the Importance of States for the Decision, as some Global Issues and matters in the contemporary globalized world do not involve States anymore, this variable can be used as a measure for a better understanding on what is expected from institutions and who comprises them, and, then, their need for reform.

At last, there will be an Independent Antecedent Variable, which is a historical concept that, in this case, will be our control to whether the diagnosed problem really exists on those paradigms or not. This will be the State Centric Base, which can be inferred by the kind of participant that should take place on a classical understanding of the paradigm, for example.

The explained process is summarized in figure 4, below:

\textsuperscript{24} Assessing whether they preclude world’s development would require a much bigger quantitative work into comparing GDPs, HDIs, GDPs per capita and so on. On this sense, I chose to keep this discussion for the theory and for some evidence.
Therefore, the first paradigm to be analyzed is Diplomacy. Diplomacy has a strong State Centric base, as it was created to serve as (and firstly conceptualized as) an interstate tool for negotiation and communication (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011). In this sense, the State Centric Base is confirmed. As Badie explains, indeed, Diplomacy is not anymore composed of only national actors, as individuals and organizations take part on it, even if they do not know or acknowledge that. This way, the Existence of New Actors is also confirmed. The impact of those actors on the diplomatic instances is to be questioned, though (Badie, 2008). It is true that some of their actions pose no difference into the state centric sphere. However, as some do, and the globalization trends boost them to become more and more important, this impact is to be considered both existent and important. On the Institutional Innovation side, both institutions that derive from diplomatic efforts have adapted to hear the opinions of individuals\(^{25}\) and diplomacy formulation institutions have changed to accept inputs from outside their own walls\(^{26}\). Considering that, Institutional Innovation is also to be considered positive. The importance of Nation States for Decisions, within Diplomacy, is very big. However, as trends show an ascendant path for individuals, representing the trends is yet more important than taking a picture, as the picture is likely to change (Badie, 2008).

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\(^{25}\) Put an example here

\(^{26}\) Either reference or put an example
Even considering the State answers for most diplomatic instances for now, individuals and their possibilities are very likely to rise and be intense participants (Badie, 2008). A table to summarize the information would look like that:

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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Antecedent Variable</strong></td>
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<td>State Centric Base</td>
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<td><strong>Independent Principal Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Existence of New Actors</td>
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<td>Institutional Innovation</td>
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After Diplomacy, we shall analyze Foreign Policy. Considering Foreign Policy to be the external reflection of a State’s interest, the State Centric Base of this paradigm is certain. As we explore international institutions where Foreign Policy is addressed and shown, it is concrete that States, as both participants and spokesmen of national interests represent themselves this State Centric Base.

As we move towards the Existence of New Actors, the discussion needs to split. On one side, in the national component of Foreign Policy, the existence and continuous action of
new actors is proven. As Foreign Affairs ministries and representatives are obliged to make a sociological analysis of their decisions at every point of the Foreign Policy building procedure, it is a fact. On the international side, as well, as decisions and negotiation rounds are formulated to address problems regarding individualized issues\(^{27}\), the existence of new actors within foreign policy analysis is proven. The analysis on their impact over foreign analysis, as well, is not a hard one. Although one might raise arguments over their position out of the rooms of discussion, one may not deny the influence the micro scenario has over the international organizations. Raising examples as big corporations, celebrities, the pope, Steve Jobs and other individuals of renown is just a few of the evidence one can provide. Kenichi would probably agree on this point. As it comes to institutional innovation, again, the split will be useful. Especially because the answer on the existence of institutional innovation differs whether we are talking on the national or the international side. In the national side, many countries have implemented participation and contribution mechanisms for their citizens to take part on foreign policy formulation. As we understand the political process to include many quarrels and several individuals, this thought cannot but increase and prove itself right, even if official policies regarding this are not approved. If one takes the international side, though, the discussion changes a lot. It is hard to find adaptation movements within international chambers of discussion, as most of the procedures and traditions are decided already. There is little space for innovation, as representatives and participants will not likely change themselves alone. In this sense, one shall not consider institutional innovation to be a trend within decision offices in the international system. The importance of the State for decisions regarding Foreign Policy, though, should go in the contrary way. There is no way one can acknowledge the micro scenario to be more important the States within Foreign Policy analysis. However, the trend is to have more and more international issues being tamed and treated by micro actors alone, without the participation of States. Nonetheless, can we account these as representations of a Nation’s foreign policy? The easier answer is no. In this sense, there is a Need for Update within Foreign Policy, as national movements and their importance in the international systems need to be accounted for. A summarizing table, then, should look like this:

\(^{27}\) WTO negotiation rounds, for instance, are driven at solving individual related issues, as they expect Foreign Policy to comply with groups of micro actors.
### Foreign Policy

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As we change for an analysis on War and Security, as for Global Issues Tackling, discussion acquires a more complex tone. This happens, as those are paradigms that hold an important feature within them, which is danger. Danger for what other individuals, nations, actors or even nature may do. Beyond, it’s a realm covered by unpredictability, as decisions or outcomes may shape other decisions and outcomes, but not always in a streamlined way. From this comes insecurity. Insecurity causes nations to hold those issues to them, to create safety protocols and to care about information, to deal with priorities and to invest in whatever can make them feel safe. Defying the view of nation states as organisms, though, and, thus, defying classical views of security problems, globalization both increases the risks of several activities and spreads the concept of security, as it creates different issues that need to be dealt with. This happens as globalization brings other individuals and actors, micro
scenario related actors, to the stage, which causes the security related activities to be much more expensive, for example. In this sense, both the State Centric Base and the existence of new actors make sense on an analysis of War and Security. The impact of those actors is also very important. Although their participation possibilities have not risen as much as in other international spheres, as Diplomacy, for instance, their potential to become sole risks or to interfere on security and global issues apart from states increased exponentially, as the micro scenario gets empowered by technology development and other features of a globalized world. In this sense, for a relatively big slice of the issues concerning countries nowadays, it is true to say that there are solutions that do not rely solely on State related action. In this sense, one is challenged to assess the last variable, institutional innovation. One of the biggest challenges regarding global issues is global governance tools incapacity to deal with them properly. In this sense, and considering threat in an expanded way, there has been very little institutional innovation due to restrictions on global governance institutions’ will and openness. Said that, there is a need for update within war, security and global issues tackling activities, as they change and increase due to globalization, and thus need a new set of solutions and analytical tools to become globalized and address concerns of global interest in a global way.

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28 The recent events involving the NSA are a good example on how this escalates, involves new actors, as sources or participants, and increases both costs and risks.
Taking Borders under analysis, the first assessment is upon Borders creation. As the geopolitical lines that divide nations, Borders can be said to contain a State Centric Base. This is very easy to uncover as we assess, for example, the borders created by European colonizers in Africa in the XIX century. Taking an expanded concept of Borders, though, and opening space for post-globalization methods of crossing them, the existence of new actors and, as well, their big impact on decisions and matters relating borders is conveniently shown. If you think, for example, of the flows of capital over borders, the count of new actors, and beyond, the importance of them, their networks, relations and the way they interact is just one of the reasons why borders have adapted to well to globalization. On institutional innovation, there should be little complaining on accepting this paradigm has adapted well. Rising of immigration flows, international jobs as options, the press access to places, regional blocs with free transit, this is all institutional innovation taken by nations in order to adapt. Taking that into account, one variable that shows an unexpected behavior is the importance of States for decisions. Although we might say borders loosen each passed day, ideas like Parag Khanna’s still bring light to the theory that borders are significant on a governance point of view. Let me be clear. The organization of the world, divided by States, is useful for governance, development and many other instances. Apart from that, it is not likely to change in any way or at least any short term forecast. In this sense, one has to acknowledge the importance of State decisions to Borders discussions, as they are, at first, the most interested on them, especially because the micro actors have relative freedom to cross them, and
secondly, officially responsible for them. In this sense, the Need for Update is not required within the paradigm of Borders, as they are both viable and compliant with a globalized world, as they recognize micro actors and empower global interaction.

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Having described the four paradigms’ in an analytical way, there are some conclusions we can draw. Applying Przeworski’s “Most Similar Systems” Design, we can draw, for now, two important conclusions. The first comes from an analysis into the differences of the results. According to Przeworski, any set of variables that differentiates these systems in a manner corresponding to the observed differences of behavior can be considered as explaining these patterns of behavior. Taking the results as shown, and especially, the divergence between Borders and the other three paradigms, we can conclude the any of the
three chosen principal variables, as representatives of the impact of globalization, if observed, may lead to a need for upgrade in the paradigm. This means globalization strongly impacts old paradigms in a way they may need to adapt, whatever the impact is. The second conclusion is that globalization described as the emergence of individual actors, shown as the micro-macro relation within the international system, is a reality, as all of the four paradigms' analyses prove it. As for it, one may also conclude that globalization impacts different paradigms of the old world in a different way, depending on the conditions in which they are conducted.

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Chapter 4

A case study on Brazil

*How to show, however, that an analysis as the proposed, over international related and international relations phenomena is feasible?*

Even after discussing how so many international matters are mistreated by state centric views, the first impression given on the usability of the new tools is that it will make political analysis harder. Not only for considering quantitative analysis to be a bigger part of international relations assessments (on the Complex Systems’ side), though. The existence of new actors within international relations and, thus, of new interactions, variables and roles, is to make any short assessment a shallow piece of work, isn’t it?

My answer is that it is not. As stated before, the problem of state centric theory based policy, institutions or analysis is that it does not recognize the importance or existence of different actors of pieces of reality, not that it has not detailed their roles within international relations. In other words, in order to make the usage of those theories a feasible act, one does not need but to recognize their importance and measure their influence (or potential influence) on phenomena. It opens possibilities for much deeper analysis, of course. Psychology and sociology may become important trends over international relations studies, if we follow the trend. State level analysis, though, may not lose their importance, as long as they accept the other instances that affect them.

This acceptance is important, not only to make analyses compliant with the world, but to prevent other episodes of obsolescence and to let an open space for the creation of analytical tools and interdisciplinary development. Considering the needed changes triggered by globalization were mostly driven by technological development, there is no space for letting other episodes of obsolescence happen, is technology is expected to reach further in the next decades. Cognitive computing, sustainable productivity, faster and cheaper transportation, distance learning, all of those trends can change, even more, the objects to which the international scholar proposes to analyze, in a sense that being a internationalist
poses challenges on understanding how these new trends affect the system and the people within it. For institutions, it cannot be different. On the second assumption, as new variables are put into stake, one might acknowledge the need for inputting, as well, other disciplines as both tools and base for explaining unpredicted kinds of interaction and action.

One of the important conclusions globalization lets us come, for instance, is that Countries are much more than the governments they embed. As new actors, the micro actors, individuals and other organizations, enter the international system, governments, besides being able to control and judge all the actions, become part of the equations that help solve and understand phenomena. Sometimes more important, sometimes less, the important part of the idea is that they are parts, along with other parts, that may play a more strategic role on solving global issues, for example. How does this impact a government, though? What should be done? To answer both these questions, and the one proposed in the beginning of the chapter, I will to make a case study. More than only answering the questions, though, this case study comes handy now. As the necessary theory has been shown, the methodological and analytical tools proposed, and the problem stressed, the last challenge I want to pose is an example of a proper usage (or attempt) of the mechanisms I believe can help update obsolete institutions. Using Brazil’s case, I want to reaffirm the importance of such kind of analysis, focusing on the needed action for government actors and the different outcomes globalization has made a path for, considering innovation over the state centric derived institutions in the country. It is going to be my small contribution for the country’s development of a better understanding of the globalized world.

To keep it short, I won’t but analyze three dilemmas within Brazilian contemporary international relations. The first is the transition of the state centric view to a law based public-private partnership. Although the model for infrastructure development exists in Brazil since the XIX century, when Pedro II built most of Brazilian railroads by providing subsidies on the Gold Tax, its emergence within Brazilian foreign affairs is relatively new. On this sense, the aimed universe of analysis is the range of government related international agencies and departments, lying into every Ministry and government institute, by now. It is true we can assess infrastructure development and Brazilian public biddings into this scope, as the largest partnerships involve multinational corporations, technology transfer and long-term commitments. I believe we can shorten the analysis by restraining the analysis to government
international related agencies, though. Programs like “Ciência sem Fronteiras” and the recent call for security rising into government IT infrastructure\(^{29}\) serve as sources for this analysis.

The first insight is that the micro actors of the micro sphere got into action on the Brazilian foreign affairs agenda. Part of the funding of the mentioned program, and also part of its organization come from private agents, in a sense that they help the government achieve its own objectives regarding this program. On the international side, the government, besides dealing with embassies and representatives, has visited universities to make deals individually, not in desispse of nation states, but on some cases in spite of them. In this sense, an analysis following both the balanced rationale of politics theory and the multiple chessboard game model can bring some enlightenment old theories cannot. Government players had to involve several private agents to both take part on the discussion over the construction of the project and its execution, as multiple interests rose. This sense, any zero-sum based theory would raise concern over those decisions, and, based on this kind of theory, the program would probably never happen. Classical state centric theory would also probably identify the sharing of technology and know-how to be strategically negative, and, thus, an issue to security, which no participant has concluded by now. In this regard, only as we see a positive sum game played in many instances in which each decision depends on the influence each individual can show and apply, the program seems logic.

If you take the presidential call as an example, as well, no state centric assessment would be able to detect the crescent rises in security flaws for the government, as both the risks were caused by individual actions and the solutions are concentrated in private-held knowledge. A systemic analysis on international flows of data and a serious consideration over the contents available in each of the involved servers could have raised this concern before, in the same way that an ecosystem analysis on the content sharing capacity of individuals could have created some concerns on security for IT before the problem had happened. Although one may arise a concern over the involvement of the US as the main agent, I may remember the private companies part of the scheme (as data holders), and the simple fact that the analysis went individually, over all kinds of data.

One might notice I used the new tools to show how an analysis should be made to make sense of contemporary phenomena in the Brazilian international agenda. However, as they have happened anyway, what would the needed action be like, for the government? If you consider the laws that govern the private public relations I drew (government, companies, \(^{29}\)http://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/noticias/dilma-autoriza-sistema-de-e-mail-contras-espionagem)
individuals, universities, agencies and so on), it is easy to notice how these laws still cannot acknowledge the participation and/or importance of the micro scenario over the macro one. In this sense, one might understand phenomena as the ones shown which are pioneers, and happened due to entrepreneurial action from individual representatives or private actors (even as the outcome of a long term procedure of influence usage and discussion). Having it adapted to new possibilities would raise the quantity of public private partnerships on the international level, to become more than a commercial relation, as public biddings are.

The second dilemma is the entrance of society on the diplomatic headquarters of the ministry of foreign affairs, in a dispute that includes both international markets and regional integration. Clearly on the realm of Badie’s thoughts, but also in compliance with Gordon Brown’s lecture on the power of globalization to empower individuals, examples that can help us understand this second dilemma are the case of Brasileia, in Acre, regarding the Haitian and other refugees, and the case of Vale’s investment in Argentina. Brasileia can help understand how the importance of the Nation State can lower into international related phenomena, as the happening shows exactly how a city, having no support from the Union, decided by itself to provide passports and refugee condition documents to refugees coming from the border, who had been ignored by other countries. Now, this does not mean the State was completely absent, but at a first moment, the city dealt with it alone, and only because of the will of the Mayor (who would be emphasized by Benjamin Barber). A subnational actor in an urgent situation, as the city communicated with other countries representatives, executed diplomacy, in despise of borders and any other restrictions. After some urging, though, the State came to action as the city could not deal with the problem alone (for instance, there were hundreds of refugees coming in a daily basis and the city could not provide shelter or documents to everybody. The case of Argentina helps us understand how a private actor’s will can draw the trade and security treaties from a country to the other, as of Vale’s will give up on the enterprise to explore minerals in the province of Mendoza\(^\text{30}\), and that would mean a big loss for Argentinian economy, Brazilian representatives were called into action and Argentinian representatives would threaten closing doors to other existing investments, in order to make pressure for Vale to come back into the country. Both Brazilian and Argentinian foreign policy formulators had to negotiate with Vale and other private agents, and the trade policy for both countries depended much on Vale’s desires, considering that case. This is an example that can show how Brazilian diplomacy has been opening doors for

the participation of other actors within it, and thus the same analytical tools used in the last dilemma could be applied here, with closely related outcomes, as we understand, for example, the trend within the ministry of foreign affairs to prioritize public opinion, the participation of NGO’s into debates and the commercial promotion of private companies into foreign trade chambers, which demonstrates, as well, institutional innovation.

Into the third and last dilemma, besides understanding how both the shown paradigms are outdated in Brazil and how the new analytical tools can help understand the country’s international relations’ scenario, I want to pose how globalization, by not being well tackled and taken advantage of, has found barriers to develop itself into Brazil and into its social inequality environment. Although the country has grown the last few years, and the ascendance of a strong middle class is an important outcome of it, social inequality is yet a very big problem. In this sense, even considering the impressive impact of globalization in the country\textsuperscript{31}, and how it has been developing to deal with it, as shown by the institutional innovation activities, the relative autonomy of new actors to impact and their importance in comparison with the State within international phenomena, the country’s social barriers still preclude a wide spread of globalization related opportunities into society. It poses a second problem, along with state centric derived obsolete institutions. What I mean is that as most Brazilians do not speak English nor have access to tools that can get them involved into international activities - which is the representation of a poor entrepreneurial ecosystem for international involvement of society - many individuals either connect to the world through indirect channels, such as national private companies that sell import services or poor media clipping releases that show biased information on world news, for example, or do not connect at all. In this sense, besides improving institutions to meet requirements posed by globalization and assessing opportunities based on new analytical tools, Brazilian authorities, as they take responsibility for connecting society to the international system, are to be faced by new boundaries, as they need to improve the necessary ecosystem, which includes, for instance, language teaching and intercultural experiences providing, in order to guarantee the success of government owned programs that rely on society to happen, for instance, Ciência Sem Fronteiras. There is a need for smart action instead of dull reaction. People are willing to seize opportunities and to adapt to whatever is shown, but as Brazil is a country that still relies

\textsuperscript{31} Brazil is a trendsetter for most social media globally, for example. Twitter, Facebook and other tools are crowded with Brazilians and their trend topics. This shows how the country’s access to Internet grew.
on XVI century industrialization through import substitution policies, internal barriers may still be the largest problems regarding a full connection of the country with the world.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

To wind up the essay, the first task is to summarize the achieved results after the research-intensive work. On the theoretical side, thus, it is important to recognize the link between Rosenau and Kenichi’s work. Both are authors that pioneered on identifying the lack of compliance between the theory that was supposed to explain the world and the world itself. Badie’s work, thus, comes as a confirmation, not only of the condition of theory, but, more importantly, as theory has developed, on the condition of institutions, which have not adapted properly, even 20 years after the first diagnostic. In this sense, the core premises for a general assessment on institutions of global governance, according to these three authors, are that, first, that they derive from an old state centric theoretical base, second, they are demanded to deal with a globalized world they cannot understand, and, to some extent, destined to fail, third, the micro scenario actors already act upon the international system, in a way that action from institutions is needed and lastly, as other actors rise and new kinds of interaction among them are thought of, the relative importance of States for international matters decreases, in a decentralization trend.

Taking these three authors as sources was important, not only to create a solid theoretical base for the essay, but to compose a comprehensive scenario, as they focus on different aspects of the international system. In this sense, political, economical, cultural and sociological matters are covered, to provide an analytical scope capable of taking an accurate picture of the contemporary world.

Taking this into account, it seems logical that the world may look harder to understand or explain. The need for new analytical tools, as we understand the condition of international institutions and their assessment over the world, becomes apparent. To provide these tools, though, one interesting comment is that it was mandatory to look for interdisciplinary sources. A qualitative research with classical tools is not capable of providing an assessment as expected from new phenomena derived from globalization, and this restriction may cause
international scholars to have to partner with different schools of knowledge, as they may be required to make sociological analysis, pose systemic quantitative assessments or create ecosystems to predict action from individual actors. This serves as an answer, as well, to the arisen problem of the increased complexity to pose political assessments on the international system. The insight to be taken by the need of using new analytical tools is not that there will be a need for more analysis, but that the same pieces of reality we are used to assess will have to be understood differently, and consider the advent of new variables and actors. This way, what happens is not an increase in complexity, but in opportunity for analysis, as more slices of reality become part of the international system.

It is important to point out that both the source theory and the provided analytical tools have limitations. One of the most important of them is that they carry a strong western bias within them. They are analysis over relations done in the white wealth west, and both eastern and emergent nations may have been misrepresented at some extent. The assessment over Brazilian relations (and the found similarities) and the discussion over the non-western authors aim at diminishing this problem. As those discussions have proved to be analogue to the considered western conclusions, and as most analyzed institutions are comprised within this same western theory, I believe this component will not be harmful to the content of the essay.

Within theory, the last achieved result is the acknowledgement of specific flaws within the four chosen paradigms. Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, War & Global Issues and Borders have proved to follow all of the theoretical assumptions derived from the source authors, and to be better explained by the provided analytical tools than by the old theory.

At this point, the methodological approach over the same problems shows some important achievements, as well. The first to be pointed out is that there is compliance between the empirical and theoretical analyzes. As the chosen paradigms are effectively demanded to change, throughout the analysis of the involved variables, the logical conclusions driven by theory, and, thus, the hypothesis, were rightly chosen.

The methodological analysis brought some insights on this subject. The first is that globalization, in any form, demands adaptation movement from institutions. Whether it is shown by a decrease in the relative power of the States, of an increase in the capacity of individuals to act and influence, or even the arousal of new problems that require institutional innovation, whenever it comes, paradigms are required to change. In this sense, the conclusion over Borders is very interesting, as Borders becomes a mid-term paradigm, which deals well both with the micro aspects of international relation (as it becomes fluid), and with
macro, State related matters (as it is an useful responsibility sharing tool). The changes Borders went through, though, are explicit as we look at Khanna’s ideas.

An important point to be made within the methodological aspect is since it shows, throughout the hypothesis testing procedure; the importance of States remains high. This complies with Mazzucato’s theory on the risk taking capacity of States, and, though, discourages extremist theoretical development over the extinction of States (although, for instance, Benjamin Barber’s urge on the empowerment of cities, for example, is useful for an understanding on power shifts and institutional innovation options). It also opens space for new understanding on the role of States as part of the considered equations over the globalized world.

Using the whole methodological process and new provided tools to analyze three dilemmas in Brazil proved also very interesting. On this point, it was very important to prove how Brazil had not been dealing well with the new opportunities that arise, but also on how the entrepreneurial ecosystem framework can help provide explanation for action, despite of State related support, for example. Brazil is far from being well adapted to the globalized world (which is already a reality and not anymore a far dream), although the nation is demanded to play the game with the big players and succeed as well. To improve the chances on taking better advantage and to improve people’s capacity to interact (providing, therefore, important bases for a well established public-private partnership), there is a need for adaptation, and thus, the needed tools for the beginning of the process have been provided.

Considering the shown results, it is important to plan some scenarios of possible phenomena or trends within the international system. In this sense, I may draw four small assessments on what I believe are the next steps for globalization, considering the righteousness of the hypothesis and the need for update and adaptation within institutions of global governance.

The first assessment is on theory. What changes on theory? The answer is easy, nothing. Theories come and go, and the different theories continue to provide different points of view that may be useful to explain different chunks of reality. Considering, though, that Globalization poses a structural change to the world, new trends of theoretical development may arise, regarding the changes led by new technological development, the importance of micro actors, new risks concerning empowerment of individuals and their capacities and so on. An important insight over this subject, though, is that the extent to which theories are chosen to explain the functionality of diverse international phenomena has to be expanded.
One cannot afford, anymore, to provide state centric theoretical explanation on international affairs, anymore, as they are not limited to this level of analysis, as pointed by Rosenau.

A second assessment is on the planned scenario for International Political Economy. As explained by Kenichi, the economical world is already mainly a concern of private and individual actors, and the borders over it are as fluid as the available capital and assets. In this sense, the need for update condition over institutions may increase their effectiveness and capacity to partner with such private institutions globally. The role of states on markets and economical chains is not to be ignored. States’ capacity to deal with global issues within economical systems, though, is to be increased only if them, and their institutions, learn to treat the world properly. Institutional Innovation is the usual solution, and, thus, shall increase, as institutions slowly learn to deal with different actors. There is much risk, of course, until they are fully adapted, as poorly explained matters may lead to a poor understanding of economical matters and, thus, to economical problems that can affect any instance of an economical chain, as explained by a complex system’s analysis, for instance.

The third assessment is over society. As said by Badie, institutions gradually need to deal with sociological aspects of society, as it rises to become, aware or not of it, actors on international relations. In this sense, considering the main factors for the empowerment of individuals are technological development and an increased capacity to understand the world and its possibilities (which Rosenau calls an increased intellectual capacity), and how these trends are to continue growing, I cannot but think of a scenario in which individuals become more and more aware of their capacity to participate. As this participation often comes within social media broadcasting of information, a critic can be posed. What is the real capacity of individual users on the Internet, for example, to organize globally and tackle global issues? The US’s NSA and Gordon Brown may agree it this capacity is latent and, therefore, there is potential for individuals to make the difference and really shape the world, or increase risks within it. Mikko Hypponen, on the other side, although recognizing the importance of taking into account the rights of individuals (on privacy, for example), presents an assessment that drives us towards thinking governments are able to control the outcomes of those interactions, at some extent. In my opinion, as they still are the main actors of most international instances, this ability exists, and poses an advantage as they can, thus, be in charge of matters and solve problems. This is a limited feature, though, as individual empowerment and the ecosystems involved, as well as the emergence characteristics of the complex system at stake evolve. In this sense, trends point towards the increased autonomy of individuals.
The fourth and last assessment is on global issues. I have pointed how new global issues may arise, as the increased capacity of individuals to act globally enters into stage. Disease related risks; information security, resource management and environmental issues arise as the possible challenges of the century, which will have to be faced. The shown analytical tools and conclusions regarding the increased autonomy of individuals to gather and solve problems are important, and Gordon Brown attests it. There are even some solutions and paths that ignore the existence of states to use private actors as the sole solutions and sources of control to deal with\textsuperscript{32}. One cannot, though, ignore the importance of the State within those solutions. States still concentrate power, influence and resources, and even considering them as simply actors within the international arena would have to consider them powerful actors, as they comprise lots of other actors within, and help different actors gather, as they provide public services and the structure for debate, for example. In this sense, I would advise for the prioritization of a public-private partnership, where resources are used to solve problems as problems arise.

An extra assessment would describe how those issues create opportunities for private actors to share and distribute, i.e., technology they have developed within different nations, in a way that a global chain of knowledge is pledged to exist and may be an option for the gathering and interactions between people, as borders loosen and global citizens arise from such partnerships.

This is, indeed, the utmost level of development for globalization, in my opinion. As borders loosen, institutions adapt, power decentralizes and individuals are made aware of the world they live in and on how they can influence it, interactions shall become part of the daily life, inasmuch technology provides assets for better analysis on trends and for a better management of a world, still comprised of nations, but maybe, and just maybe, not anymore comprised of nationals, but of global citizens.

\textsuperscript{32} For instance, I am referring to a WWF effort to turn 40-70\% of global commodities into sustainable production by tackling the top 100 companies that control production within the supply chains.
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